R2PRIS Methodological Framework

• State of the Art Analysis
• Collection of Approaches, Lessons Learned and Practices in the Field of Radicalisation
• Development of a Methodological Framework for Analysing Radicalisation within Prisons

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# Project

**R2PRIS – Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons**

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This report was developed by the partnership of R2PRIS Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons (2015-1-PT01-KA204-013062) project with the aim of presenting its first deliverable: the R2PRIS Methodological Framework.

Led by West University of Timisoara, the output was achieved through four tasks, namely (i) a state of the art analysis on violent extremism and radicalisation within prisons, (ii) a collection of approaches, lessons learned and practices on tackling the phenomena, (iii) the development of a methodological framework for analysing de-radicalisation strategies within prison and (iv) the establishment of a panel of experts in the field.

Developed in part I of this report, the state of the art analysis brings forward the concepts associated with the phenomena of radicalisation and violent extremism, the main general explanatory frameworks concerning the phases, pathways and levels of radicalisation, and also the main issues regarding prisoner radicalisation. The main indicators on how to identify vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation are also presented in this section.

Part II of the report provides an overview of the approaches and practices in the field of de-radicalisation employed by the prison services in four of the participant countries in the project: Belgium, Norway, Romania, and Turkey. For this purpose, a data collection tool in the form of a survey was developed and deployed.

Based on the desk research findings and on the collected approaches and practices, the partnership developed a methodological framework for analysing de-radicalisation strategies in the prison environment, which is showcased in part III.

The theoretical framework highlighted that radicalisation is a dynamic process emerging from the interaction between several groups of factors. Therefore, one conclusion of this report is that prison radicalisation is likely to be influenced mainly by three-level factors:
• Individual
• Among prisoners
• Prison service/environment

The R2PRIS partnership recommends that a 4-step approach towards effective analysis of radicalisation processes within prisons, namely:

1. Assessing the risk associated with factors related to prison service;
2. Assessing the risk associated with factors present among prisoners;
3. Identifying vulnerable prisoners at risk of becoming radicalized; and
4. Analysing the coexistence of and interaction between factors from the three categories within a specific prison.
Background of the study

In September 2015, the project Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons (R2PRIS) was approved by the European Commission under Erasmus+ Programme’ Key Action 2 - Cooperation for innovation and the exchange of good practices: Strategic Partnerships for adult education. The Erasmus+ programme aims to boost skills and employability, as well as modernising Education, Training, and Youth work. Regarding Adult Education, Erasmus+ aims to improve the quality of adult learning across Europe.

R2PRIS is a 3-year transnational European project, coordinated by the BSAFE LAB within the University of Beira Interior in Covilhã, Portugal. The project seeks to reduce radicalization and extremism inside prisons by enhancing the competences of frontline staff (correctional officers, educational staff and psychologists, social workers) to identify, report and interpret signals of radicalisation and respond appropriately.

Specific goals include:

1. Create awareness on the broad picture of terrorism, the mindset, and narratives used by understanding:
   a) why prisons are a breeding ground for radicalisation;
   b) the difference between conversion, radicalisation and moving to extremist views (terminology);
   c) the pathways and levels of radicalisation, role in the network;
   d) recruitment tactics employed within the prison environment; and
   e) indicators on how to identify vulnerable people at risk of radicalization;

2. Develop the tools and instruments for prison administration and line-level staff to recognize signs of radicalisation at an early stage within their specific facility;

3. Provide common, consistent and effective instruments to help staff report their observations to the appropriate intelligence staff;
4. Provide model procedures for intelligence staff to vet the data they receive from prison staff and to appropriately interpret it;

5. Establish a series of training programmes and tools for all staff within a prison to respond appropriately to potentially vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation.

R2PRIS partnership is expected to develop 6 intellectual outputs / tangible deliverables:

| O1. Methodological Framework | 01/A1 - State of the art analysis |
|                             | 01/A2 - Collection of approaches, lessons learned and practices in the field of (de-)radicalisation |
|                             | 01/A3 - Development of a methodological framework for analysing de-radicalization strategies within prison |
|                             | 01/A4 - Establishment of a panel of experts in the field |

| O2. Radicalization screening tool | 02/A1 - Radicalization screening tool development |
|                                | 02/A2 - Radicalization screening piloting and fine-tuning |

| O3. Training curricula and program | 03/A1 - Individual competences assessment |
|                                    | 03/A2 - Development of a comprehensive training module for all target groups (prison staff, administration, and trainers) |
|                                    | 03/A3 - Piloting and fine-tuning of the Training programme |

| O4. E-learning training course | 04/A1 - Development of the e-learning course and complementary materials |
|                               | 04/A2 - Piloting and fine-tuning of the e-learning programme |

| O5. Train the trainer course | 05/A1 - Development of the training course for trainers |
|                            | 05/A2 - Piloting and fine-tuning of the train the trainer course |

This report has been accomplished during the project Radicalization Prevention in Prisons (2015-1-PT01-KA204-013062), implemented with financial support of the European Commission by the Erasmus + Programme. This publication reflects the views only of the authors. The Portuguese National Agency ERASMUS+ Education and Training and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
Bringing together international experts in the field of radicalisation and national prison administrations from Romania, Belgium, Turkey, Norway and Portugal, the R2PRIS project offers an innovative training programme for prison staff on how to recognise and prevent the process of radicalisation inside prisons.

The project’s target group is composed of 180 prison professionals from 5 different countries (Portugal, Norway, Turkey, Belgium, and Romania) which will undergo a training programme with 5 components and 160 sessions of 3 hours per course: class, online, short-term staff training, work-based assignments and coaching/consultancy. An e-learning course will be developed and also a train-the-trainer course. Three short-term staff training events will also be conducted. To disseminate the project’s results, 5 national seminars and one international seminar are foreseen.

As short-term effects, the trainees will gain the necessary knowledge and tools to recognise and prevent the process of radicalization inside prisons. The potential positive and long-lasting impact of R2PRIS project are the increase of awareness of prison systems in Europe to the issue of radicalisation and the reduction of radicalisation and violent extremism in the community.
PART I. State of the art analysis

Introduction

The first objective of R2PRIS Project is to create awareness of the broad picture of violent extremism and to provide an understanding of the critical issues that are turning prisons into breeding grounds for radicalisation into violent extremism. Further, the project aims at developing strategies to help prison staff prevent prisoner radicalisation. In order to achieve project’s aims, we will develop an innovative methodological framework for analysing radicalisation processes and developing prevention strategies within prison. The first step in this endeavour is the analysis of state of the art in the field of radicalisation in general and prison radicalisation in particular.

The state of the art will address the following questions:
1. What is radicalisation and violent extremism? What are the terminology differences between conversion, radicalisation and moving to extremist views?
2. How does radicalisation lead to violent extremism? What are the different pathways and levels of radicalisation? Do social networks play a significant role in this process?
3. What are the main theories that try to explain violent extremism?
4. How do the official institutions respond to violent extremism?
5. Why are prisons a breeding ground for radicalisation? What recruitment tactics are employed within the prison environment?
6. What are the main indicators on how to identify vulnerable people at risk of radicalisation?
1. What is radicalisation and violent extremism? What are the terminology differences between conversion, radicalisation and moving to extremist views?

1.1. What is radicalisation?

The term radicalisation has been labelled as “a post-9/11 child” because it was introduced as a necessity to replace the “ordinary terms” used before those ferocious attacks to describe the phenomenon (Silke, 2014a). Consequently, it is “at present the standard term used to describe what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479). But despite its popularity and although many believe that radicalisation is “the most serious contemporary threat to global security” (Borum, 2011a, p. 9), there is still little consensus as to what is meant by radicalisation. In the literature, radicalisation has been defined as:

...“a process where a previously passive individual changes to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist, and has been closely tied with those involved in terrorism” (McGilloway, Ghosh, & Bhui, 2015, p. 39);

...“the social and psychological process by which an individual adopts an extremist ideology” (Braddock, 2014);

...“the process by which individuals (or groups) change their beliefs, adopt an extremist viewpoint and advocate (or practice) violence to achieve their goals” (Porter & Kebbell, 2011, p. 213);

...“a process involving significant change in an individual’s or group’s orienting beliefs and motivations. Through processes of radicalisation some people will come to assume an extremist viewpoint, wherein they are willing to countenance or enact violence in pursuit of their goals” (Innes, Abbott, Lowe, & Roberts, 2007, p. 38);
...“the process whereby individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be normal into a range that society tends to consider to be extreme” (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p.2);

...“the process through which individuals identify, embrace, and engage in furthering extremist ideologies and goals” (Southers, 2013, p. 54);

..."a personal process in which the individual adopts extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence” (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010, p. 8);

...“the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism)” (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010, p. 10);

...“a process of adopting an extremist belief system and the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence and fear, as a method of effecting changes in society. Radicalisation can take place within any extremist group (from left/right wing groups to environmentalist, separatist and terrorist groups). It is important to note that radicalisation, as such, does not necessarily have to result in terrorism and the use of violence” (Precht, 2007, p. 16);

...“a process in which an individual's convictions and willingness to seek for deep and serious changes in the society increase. Radicalism and radicalisation are not necessarily negative. Moreover, different forms of radicalisation exist” (Fraihi, 2008, p. 135);

Although different from each other, these definitions provide the following core characteristics by which the concept of radicalisation is commonly understood and described in the literature:
1) Radicalisation is a process, not an event, which means that it develops gradually, over time;

2) Radicalisation may occur at three levels: individual, group, or mass public;

3) Radicalisation involves change in attitudes, ideology, beliefs, motivations, worldview, ideals, goals, aspirations, willingness or/and behavior;

4) Those aspects that are changing in the process of radicalisation become extreme;

5) Those extreme aspects are related to political, social, religious, or societal issues;

6) As a result of those changes, radicalised people may advocate, support, or practice violence or/and terrorism to achieve their goals.

The sixth characteristic does not appear in all definitions because scholars in the field often distinguish between violent radicalisation and cognitive or non-violent radicalisation. Vidino and Brandon (2012) define cognitive radicalisation as “the process through which an individual adopts ideas that are severely at odds with those of the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure based on a completely different belief system”. According to the same authors, violent radicalisation “occurs when an individual takes the additional step of employing violence to further the views derived from cognitive radicalism.” (p. 9). Bartlett and Miller (2012) distinguish between violent radicalisation, which is “a process by which individuals come to undertake or directly aid or abet terrorist activity” and non-violent radicalisation, that refers to “the process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, aid, or abet terrorist activity” (p. 2).

Many authors (e.g. Borum, 2011a; Sedgwick, 2010; Schmid, 2013) have attempted to review the current definitions of the term in order to grasp its most common accepted meaning, but all they could find is a plethora of definitions and very little consensus on what characteristics describe the concept best. Sedgwick (2010) argues that the concept of radicalisation is a source of confusion because it is used in three different contexts,
with three different, and sometimes even conflicting, agendas: the security context, the integration context, and the foreign-policy context. In an attempt to bring some clarification, Sedgwick makes the distinction between a relative and an absolute meaning of the terms “radical”, “radicalism” and “radicalisation”. Relative is used to indicate a relative position on a continuum of opinions, attitudes, beliefs or behaviours, were a moderate position is acceptable to a large number of people. Therefore, in its relative meaning, the term “radical” is used as a synonym for “extremist” and in opposition to “moderate” with the meaning of “representing or supporting an extreme section of a party” (Oxford English Dictionary as cited in Sedgwick, 2010, p. 481). Most of the existing definitions of the concept are, however, absolute and they reveal significant disagreements. The author identified three different types of absolute definitions: philosophical, analytic, and official. The philosophical definitions are, according to the author, of little use when dealing with the phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation. The analytic definitions do not include the wider circumstances in analysis, and, therefore, are confusing because they combine disparate varieties of radicalism. The official definitions of radicalisation that were analysed by Sedgwick, are from five countries – the U.S., Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark –, and have only three major points of agreement among them. “The first of three major points of agreement among all five countries is that the radical is not the same as the terrorist. The terrorist is presumed to be a radical, but the radical is not presumed to be a terrorist or at least not yet. Secondly, the radical is generally defined by reference to the “extremist”. Thirdly, most definitions include a reference to the radical as a threat. Thus a U.S. definition from a Congressional bill specifies “the purpose of facilitating ... violence”, a Canadian definition from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) includes the phrase “could eventually (but not always) lead to... direct action” and a Dutch definition from the General Intelligence and Security Service includes the phrase ‘which may constitute a danger to the continuity of the democratic legal order”’ (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 483). Ultimately, Sedgwick proposes the abandonment of the use of “radicalisation” as an absolute concept, and the use of it as a relative concept.
Therefore, because the main focus of our project is on radicalisation in prisons, we will pay particular attention to the process of radicalisation within the context of prison system, since experts also agree that prison radicalisation “is driven by behaviours and conditions that are typical of the prison environment” (Neumann, 2010, p. 25).

1.1.1. Prison radicalisation

The U.S. Department of Justice (2014, p. 6) defines prisoner radicalisation as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes”. According to the same source, a distinction needs to be made between prisoner radicalisation and terrorist recruitment, which means that inmates are solicited to engage in terrorist behaviour or commit terrorist acts. According to Goldman (2014, p. 55), “the term prison radicalisation usually refers to individuals being radicalised in prison, not that terrorist plots are being formulated in prison”.

A large part of prison radicalisation literature focuses on Islamist radicalisation and extremism (e.g. Hamm, 2013; Home Affairs Select Committee, 2012; Ramakrishna, 2014). However, researchers from the RAND Corporation believe that “one of the most glaring gaps in the literature is the failure to examine the similarities and differences between Islamist militants and other types of extremists [...] many studies simply assume that there are no relevant differences, while others assert that Islamist extremists are uniquely dangerous and irreconcilable. Although it is evident that religious doctrine distinguishes militant Islamists from other radicals, the effects have not been fully explored. Because they are motivated by faith, Islamist radicals are more committed than nonreligious extremists.” (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2013, p. 26-27).

However, it is important to acknowledge that prison radicalisation is not limited to Islamists. “It is a long-standing concern that, for instance, has generated a substantial qualitative literature on imprisoned ethno-nationalist violent extremist offenders, especially those associated with organisations in Europe, notably the Irish Republican Army, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Red Army Faction and National Liberation Front of...
Corsica. However, with the rise of Islamist offenders, prison radicalisaiton appears to have undergone a qualitative shift.” (Skillicorn, Leuprecht, Stys, & Gobeil, 2015, p. 2).

1.2. What is the terminology difference between radicalisation and moving towards extremist views?

From the reviews of the definitions of radicalisation, we can deduce that the process of radicalisation involves moving towards extremist views. What views are extreme depends on what society tends to consider being normal and what society tends to consider to be extreme (Hannah et al., 2008). But, at this point, a confusion is often made between radicalism and extremism (the two terms or often equated). While both radicalism and extremism can be described in terms of distance from mainstream, moderate positions, the two terms need further differentiation (Schmid, 2013; 2014). From a historical perspective, “radicalism is less of a problem for democracies than extremism. Radicalism could be accommodated in the past in democratic systems because it has been mostly open-minded and pragmatic whereas extremism, especially when linked to religion, has closed the door to rational inquiry because the true believer thinks (s)he is already in possession of all the answers and there is only one solution to the problem. Intolerance and self-righteousness make these persons a threat to others who do not wish to submit to their dictates” Schmid (2013, p. 54). Therefore, an important distinction should be made between radicals and extremists: while radicals are open-minded people, who think that all human beings are equals, accept diversity and base their thinking on reason rather than dogma, extremists are close-minded people, who do not tolerate diversity and democracy and adhere “to a simplified mono-causal interpretation of the world where you are either with them or against them, part of the problem or part of the solution” (Schmid, 2013, p.10, 2014). For example, in the context of Islam, an example of radicals are those who Schmid (2014) calls “cultural” Muslims, who are integrated into the Western societies, people who are open-minded, peaceful, and consent to Western core values like democracy and the separation of religion and state. However, in the radicalisation literature, the main focus is on extremist Islamists.
1.2.1. Extremist views specific to the prison context

Within a context of the prison system, there are specific extremist views that inmates can adhere to.

Interesting research attempting to uncover these kinds of views has been conducted by the Pew Research Centre Forum on Religion in Public Life (Boddie & Funk, 2012). They conducted a 50-state survey of prison chaplains in order to explore their perspectives on the religious life of the prisoners.

The survey asked chaplains to explain, in their own words, the kinds of extreme religious views they encounter among prisoners. The researchers categorized the responses at this open-ended question in terms of key ideas or themes and in terms of the specific religious groups they cite as espousing extreme views.

The results showed that 41% of the chaplains who answered the question referred to some form of racial intolerance or prejudice toward social groups. This includes expressions of racial superiority or supremacy by either black or white inmates (36%) as well as hostility toward gays and lesbians, negative views of women and intolerance toward sex offenders or other inmates based on the nature of their criminal offense. Almost 40% mentioned instances of religious (as opposed to racial) intolerance. This includes expressions of religious exclusivity as well as attempts to intimidate or coerce others into particular beliefs. 28% of the chaplains cited requests for special foods, clothing or rituals – even though, such requests for religious accommodation frequently are granted. Some chaplains expressed frustration over requests that they view as bogus or extreme, such as seeking raw meat for a Voodoo ritual or a religious diet consisting of goat’s milk, vegetables, and oatmeal with sugar.

1.2.2. Islamist extremist views

The main views within Islam which are often considered by various scholars as being radical or extreme are Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism. The term Islamism is generally used to convey the idea that Islam is not only a religion but also a political
system, and that is why it is also labelled as “political Islam” (Hirschkind, 1997). Islamism has been defined as “forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal system derive directly from the shari’ah” (Mandaville as cited in Vidino & Brandon, 2012, p. 9). Islamic fundamentalism is a form of Islam whose followers adhere to a literalist interpretation of the Quran, believing in the ‘fundamental’ truths of the holy scripts of Islam and seeking to remove any non-Islamic influences from their lives (Roy, 1994).

Salafism is such a growing fundamentalist movement within Sunni Islam that takes the pious ancestors as exemplary models aiming to restore the perfection of early Islam practiced by Muhammad and his Companions (Ungureanu, 2011). Schmidt (2014, p. 15) states that the fundamentalist values of the salafists “are considered extreme by the prevailing norms of West European societies and widely considered incompatible with core principles of modern liberal-democratic societies such as the separation of state and religion, popular sovereignty, gender equality, respect for minority rights and acceptance of laws decided upon by a majority of people”. However, what westerners consider extreme, they call Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism (Esposito, 1992). Some scholars agree that many Salafists and other Muslims who are strongly devoted to their fundamental beliefs and who are committed to intense da’wa or missionary practices are considered radicals because they deviate from the mainstream western values - largely opposing them - but they focus on non-violent means by which to achieve fundamental changes in society and restore the purity of Islam (Gendrom, 2006). However, the reality is that often “movements that initially preached religious fundamentalism later began to support, and educate to, violence against the ‘infidel’ enemies, be they Christians, Jews, or even Muslims who did not favor a radical interpretation of Islam” (Ganor, 2015, p.19). Schmid (2014, p. 16) explains that “Islamists sometimes claim to be opposed to terrorism but when one refers to a particular act of violence perpetrated by Islamists that is widely understood as an act of terrorism, they claim that is part of a legitimate jihad (effort or struggle on God’s way to ensure the
supremacy of Islam) and therefore cannot be possibly labelled terrorism. In the perspective of militant jihadists, much depends on who is the target rather than what is the nature of the act and who are the victims”.

Therefore, drawing a clear distinction between radical and extremist violent Islamist views represents an almost impossible task. Stressing this idea, one of the leading experts in suicide terrorism, Robert Pape (2006, p. 8) pointed that “differences between the terrorists and more ‘moderate’ leaders usually concern the usefulness of a certain level of violence and, sometimes, the legitimacy of attacking additional targets besides foreign troops in the country, such as attacks in other countries or against third parties and civilians. Thus, it is not that terrorists pursue radical goals and then seek others’ support. Rather, terrorists are simply the members of their societies who are the most optimistic about the usefulness of violence for achieving goals that many, and often most, support”.

Although it is difficult to elucidate objectively what represents extreme views in terms of ideologies and goals as far as the political Islam is concerned, the violence of the means utilized in order to achieve political goals is definitely considered extreme, especially violence wielded against civilians. A report by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Services (2004) describes in detail various strategic views within radical Islam concerning the goals to be achieved, and the means used to reach them. The authors point out that only some of the movements pursue their political objectives through violent means. According to Precht (2007), only a small minority of Islamists is in favour of violent confrontation; missionary Islam is essentially apolitical and does not use violence. Therefore, the most extreme views within radical Islam concern the use of violence against civilians to achieve political, ideological, or religious goals, which is endorsing terrorism (Ganor, 2015). The goals of using violence may seem totally legitimate to extremists. For example, extremist jihadists, the adherents of the holy war against infidels (i.e. non-Muslims or Muslims who do not adhere to the right interpretation of Islam), declared jihad to be the sixth pillar of Islam and an individual
moral duty for every Muslim (Schmid, 2014). Muslims who lose their lives while performing acts of Jihad are considered martyrs (Morgan, 2010). The self-proclaimed “freedom-fighters” consider that the struggle for “national liberation” is a moral duty, justifying the use of violence by their goal perceived as noble (Ganor, 2000). Islamist terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, consider that jihad through violence against civilians (non-believers) is a reasonable response to aggression by the West and also an adequate strategy to remove the obstacles from the West to Islamic religious reform and progress (Devlin-Foltz & Ozkececi-Taner, 2010). However, as Ganor (2015, p. 8) states, „neither freedom nor any other legitimate political goal can justify the use of terrorism”.

1.3. What is violent extremism

In order to better understand the concept of violent extremism, we need to clarify first what extremism means. Referring to extremism, Neumann (2010, p. 12) notes: “The term can be used to refer to political ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles. In the context of liberal democracies, this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and human rights. However, the term can also be used to describe the methods through which political actors attempt to realize their aims, that is, by using means that show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others. Many governments refer to terrorists as violent extremists”. The UK National Offender Management Service (NOMS, 2014) provides one of the most comprehensive legal descriptions of terrorist and extremist offenders. It includes the following types of offences that take place during an act of terrorism or for the purposes of terrorism: murder; manslaughter; wounding with intent; administering poison etc.; explosives; causing explosions; endangering life by damaging property; biological weapons; chemical weapons; directing a terrorist organisation; inciting terrorism overseas; terrorist bombing overseas; preparation of terrorism acts; serious fraud; conspiracy, incitation or attempt to commit an offence such as those previously mentioned (p.3); weapons training; directing terrorist organisation; possession of article for terrorist purposes; inciting terrorism overseas; genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and related offences, other than one involving murder; use etc of nuclear weapons; assisting or inducing certain weapons-related acts overseas; use of noxious substance or thing to cause harm or intimidate; preparation of terrorist acts; training for terrorism; making or possession of radioactive device or material; use of radioactive device or material for terrorist purposes etc. (p. 4).

Radicalisation Awareness Network, the Working Group on Prison and Probation (RAN P&P, 2016, p. 1) defines violent extremism as “promoting, supporting or committing acts of terrorism aimed at defending a political ideology which advocates racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy and which opposes the core democratic principles and values of a given society”. Therefore, the term violent extremism is used in relation to terrorist acts.

Based on a review of 526 articles on the subject of violent extremism, a team of researchers that prepared a report for the Australian Government’s Department of Defense noted: “the concept violent extremism is often interchanged with terrorism, political violence, and extreme violence. The literature covering violent extremism employs the concept in a way that suggests it is self-evident and self-explanatory. Often enough the need to counter violent extremism is noted in the literature but no actual definition of what constitutes violent extremism is provided. The fact is, the terms violent extremism, political violence, political terrorism and terrorism have been used interchangeably in the Australian and international literature examined. Thus, no real distinction between violent extremism and terrorism has fully evolved, in fact, it remains an evolving concept” (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, & Caluya, 2011, p.9).

Schmid (2014) argues that in the context of Islam in Western societies, “violent extremists” are those Islamists who completely reject Western core values and embrace violence as an instrument to establish a worldwide Islamic caliphate and sharia rule. They are not open-minded and not willing to integrate into their host societies. They could be assessed in terms of: “respect for the constitution and the laws of the democratic state of which they are citizens or residents; respect for universal human rights in general and
equal rights for women in particular; presence or absence of efforts to create a parallel society that is separate from the democratic society; presence or absence of efforts to introduce and enforce sharia-law in its own communities; evidence of incitement to jihad or glorification of (suicide) terrorism; evidence of financial support for jihad in Muslim-majority countries facing Islamist insurgencies; and participation in armed struggles in conflict zones” (Schmid, 2014, p. 18). Further, Schmid (2014) describes “non-violent extremists” as those members of political Islamism groups, such as parties and lobby groups, but also members of missionary Islamism groups. These two groups of Islamists have in common that they do not openly advocate jihad, but the difference between them is “often only one of strategy and tactics, depending on place and time” (p.18). While these people could pass as non-violent Islamists, Schmid argues that the difference between their language and the one of Al Quaida type of violent extremists is often just a matter of degree.

1.4. The relation between conversion and radicalisation

Most scholars agree that “religious conversion is not the same as radicalisation” (Neumann, 2010, p. 2), but there are different perspectives in the literature on how the two distinct concepts are related. Especially when the focus is on Islamist radicalisation, conversion is sometimes viewed as a phase in the radicalisation process. For example, Precht (2007) developed a four-phased model of the radicalisation process in which conversion occurs as the second phase that follows the “pre-radicalisation” phase. Conceptualised as such, conversion is the process that occurs when individuals change their religious identity or behaviour. “It is a transformation that can take three forms: 1) from no specific faith or religious observance to a religious identity; 2) from a normal religious observance to a more radical interpretation of religion; 3) a shift from one faith to another (e.g. from Christianity to Islam)” (Precht, 2007, p. 35). According to Precht, the main factor that is believed to start this transformation process is individuals’ frustration with their own life or with political or societal issues. This frustration drives individuals to begin a quest for a cause and a new identity. They usually find it in an action oriented
Islam, which is associated with the ideology of radical Islam. They begin to attend or increase attendance at the Mosques or places where radical Islam is discussed and start showing social commitment. Some of them also begin to change their appearance, such as by wearing Islamic clothes and growing a beard.

Therefore, in Precht’s model, conversion is crucial in the radicalisation process, a phase that is followed by conviction/indoctrination phase.

Different perspectives on conversion are offered by the literature on prisoner radicalisation. Hamm’s (2009) review of this literature revealed two opposing perspectives on prisoner conversion to Islam and its role in the radicalisation process. One perspective is that prisons have become incubators for Islamic terrorism due to the growing number of inmate conversion to Islam (Beckford, Joly, & Khosrokhavar, 2005). An increase in conversion is also often viewed by inmates and prison staff as an indication of prison radicalisation rather than an authentic expression of faith (Hamm, 2013). The other perspective is that Muslim converts in prisons are less susceptible to terrorist recruitment due to their inner transformation and reformation, which further plays a vital role in their rehabilitation. The arguments in favour of this last perspective are that “the criminological evidence indicates that there is no relationship between prisoner conversions to Islam and terrorism. If anything, just the opposite is true. Research shows that Islam has a moderating effect on prisoners that plays an important role in prison security and rehabilitation. Once on the path to restructuring their lives — down to the way they eat, dress, form support systems and divide their day into study, prayer and reflection — Muslim prisoners have begun the reformation process, making them less of a recruiting target for terrorists than other prisoners, and certainly less of a target than alienated street corner youths of the urban ghetto” (Hamm, 2009, p. 669).

Maruna, Wilson, and Curran (2006) noted that “the prison provides a stark and vivid social context for exploring the conditions that allow for quantum personality change. The prison can be understood as one of the social contexts in which self-identity is most likely to be questioned” (p. 163). Therefore, many prisoners use religion as a method of
coping with the harsh environment of the prison (Clear & Sumter, 2002). Research suggests that many prisoners enter prison with little or no religious pursuits, but over the duration their incarceration, many of them turn to religion (Thomas & Zaitow, 2006).

Hamm (2012) thoroughly examined a number of 46 cases of terrorists who have spent time in prison before committing or attempting to commit a terrorist attack. The results in Table 1 show the percentages of terrorists who underwent a conversion to some form of faith while in custody.

Table 1. Terrorist Prisoners’ Religious Conversions in Hamm’s study of 46 cases (Source: Hamm, 2012, p. 179)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prisoner Religious Conversions</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Islam/Salafi Jihadist</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation of Islam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moorish Science Temple</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison Islam (Wahhabi)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odinism/Asatru</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Conversion (Already Sunni/Salafi)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Marxism)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 17% of the terrorist sample in Hamm’s study did not convert in prison. All of them (8 individuals) were already either Sunni Muslims or Salafists. The analysis of these cases revealed that they were nevertheless further radicalized in prison. For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s top lieutenant, who had been incarcerated and tortured in Egyptian prisons in the early 1980s, was already an Islamic militant when he entered prison, but Hamm cites analysts who believe that his ideology became even more extreme as a result of the torture he endured in prison. His terrorist acts, including the 9/11 attacks, are considered an attempt to get revenge on Western allies of the Egyptian government for the treatment he endured in prison.
Hamm (2007) emphasizes the complexity of the phenomenon of religious involvement among prisoners, describing the following typologies of converts, based on their reasons for conversion:

a. **The Crisis Converts**, who turn to religion to help them cope with personal crisis, such as the loss of liberty, struggles with addictions, illness, broken family relationships etc.;

b. **The Protection-Seeking Converts**, who are motivated to be members in a faith group by their need for physical protection;

c. **The Searching Converts**, who had no religious background prior to their imprisonment, but are attracted by the multitude of religious options in the prison environment; in their spiritual quest, this kind of individuals can easily jump from one religion and faith group to another.

d. **The Manipulating Converts** are those who join a faith group for manipulative purposes, such as the right to special diets, clothing, religious emblems, beads, beards, religious publications, musical instruments, access to clergy, opportunities for religious gatherings, especially as a means to show a moral, pro-social and law-abiding behaviour in front of the prison authorities.

e. **The Free-World Recruited Converts** are those who engage in interactions with free-world religious leaders who provide them with religious materials in prison and promise them help and resources after their release.

Stern (2010, p.98) noted that “interestingly, terrorists who claim to be driven by religious ideology are often ignorant about Islam. [...] the vast majority of [them], had received little formal education and had only a limited understanding of Islam. In the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, second- and third-generation Muslim youth are rebelling against the kind of soft Islam practiced by their parents and promoted in local mosques. They favour what they think is the purer Islam, uncorrupted by Western culture, which is touted on some Web sites and by self-appointed imams from the Middle East who are barely educated themselves. For example, the Netherlands based terrorist cell known as
the Hofstad Group designed what one police officer described as a do-it-yourself version of Islam based on interpretations of takfiri ideology (takfir is the practice of accusing other Muslims of apostasy) culled from the Internet and the teachings of a drug dealer turned cleric”.

It is important to acknowledge that, as a report from Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2009) concludes “there is a tendency in the media to portray conversion to Islam as a sort of fast track to terrorist action. However, Islam is one of the fastest growing faiths in the world. An estimated 25 per cent of American Muslims are converts and anywhere from 10,000 to 20,000 people convert to Islam each year in the United Kingdom. Most converts to Islam are simply that — average people who have found that Islam speaks to them as a faith. Nevertheless, converts are a constant in Islamist terrorist plots. About half of the subjects involved in disrupted plots in the United States are converts. Internationally, a number of Islamic leaders have expressed concerns around the susceptibility of the convert community to radicalisation, noting that the experience of conversion can create an emotional state that is easy for radicalisation agents to manipulate. The life stories of individuals like Germaine Lindsay, Jamal Walters, and John Walker Lindh seem to bear this out. Conversion is not necessarily a precursor to extremism, but it cannot be ruled out as a contributing factor in the development of extremist thinking”.
2. How does radicalisation lead to violent extremism? What are the different pathways and levels of radicalisation? Do social networks play a significant role in this process?

2.1. How does radicalisation lead to violent extremism?

Many scholars and experts have attempted to understand and describe the process of radicalisation in order to find documented ways to prevent this process to occur or to evolve into violent action. There many phase-models of the radicalisation process described in the literature: Borum’s (2003) four-phase process of extremist ideological development; Sageman’s (2004) four-prong process of Islamist radicalisation; Wiktorowicz’s (2004) four dimensions of social influence on the individual towards radicalisation; Moghaddam’s (2005) staircase to terrorism model; Taarnby’s (2005) eight-stage process; Musa and Bendett’s (2010) model of Islamist radicalisation; McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008) mechanisms of radicalisation (for a review see Borum, 2011b; Young, Zwenk, & Rooze, 2013). These models put emphasis on different factors, and most of them agree that the phases are not necessarily sequential.

One of the most widely used phase models is the model developed by the New York Police Department Intelligence Division and described by Silber and Bhatt (2007). The model focuses on the Jihadi-Salafi radicalisation process and distinguishes four phases in this process. Phase 1 – Pre-Radicalisation describes individual's characteristic and life before the beginning of his radicalisation (male Muslims, second or third-generation immigrants, from middle-class backgrounds, having ‘ordinary’ lives and jobs, and with little, if any, criminal history). Phase 2 – Self-Identification describes the individual's opening towards a new interpretation of the world offered by radical Islam; he begins to gravitate away from his former identity and to associate with like-minded individuals. Phase 3 – Indoctrination describes the stage at which the individual wholly adopts Jihadi-Salafi ideology and commits himself to the achievement of the militant
Jihadists’ goals. Phase 4 – *Jihadization* entails individual’s self-designation as a holy warrior and actual engagement in planning, preparation and/or execution of acts of violence.

A similar four-stage model, from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is reproduced in Figure 1.

*Figure 1. FBI model of Muslim extremism radicalisation process (Source: Patel, 2011, p. 17)*

Kruglanski and colleagues (2014) developed a model of radicalisation based on the notion that the quest for personal significance constitutes a major motivational force that may push individuals toward violent extremism. In their conceptualization, radicalisation is the process of supporting or engaging in activities deemed as in violation of important social norms, such as the killing of civilians. The radicalisation model (figure 2) contains three components: (1) the *motivational* component, which is the quest for
personal significance, defines a goal to which one may be committed, (2) the **ideological** component, identifies the means of violence as appropriate for this goal’s pursuit, and (3) the **social process of networking and group dynamics** through which the individual comes to share in the violence justifying ideology and proceeds to implement it as a means of significance gain.

**Figure 2.** Kruglanski et al.’s significance-quest model of radicalisation (Source: Kruglanski et al., 2014, p. 79)

Within R2PRIS project we focus our attention especially on the processes of radicalisation leading to violent extremism in the context of the prison system.

### 2.1.1. How does radicalisation lead to violent extremism within prison?

**Seven-phased model of prisoner radicalisation**

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Sinai (2014) has developed a seven-phased model of radicalisation into violent extremism and terrorism (figure 3). This model emphasizes the critical patterns of these processes based on research within the U.S. prison system. In each of the seven phases, specific factors are crucial for the progression of radicalisation processes.

**Figure 3. Sinai's phased model of prison radicalisation (Source: Sinai, 2014)**

In **Phase 1**, a number of **personal factors** prepare the ground for potential radicalisation. According to the author, within the U.S. prison context, most of the inmates begin their incarceration with no particularly strong religious or ideological affiliation. Nevertheless, many of these individuals have a number of characteristics that make them potentially susceptible and vulnerable to radicalisation. Among these factors, the most important are: (1) history of violent behaviour; (2) anti-social attitudes; (3) a combination of personal crisis and low self-esteem; (4) a very small proportion of these individuals may suffer from mental health disorders; (5) sense of victimisation; (6) feelings of compromised identity and alienation; (7) need to belong to empowering religion/ideology; (8) seek to wipe away previous criminal deeds; (9) spiritual seeking; (10) need an external entity to blame for their personal problems; (11) political grievances, and (12) need for physical protection.

In **Phase 2**, **situational/contextual factors and enablers** facilitate the progression of vulnerable individuals in the processes of radicalisation into violent extremism. The most important of these factors are: (1) presence of extremist social networks, such as religious-based gangs, that provide the protection, physical and social support that vulnerable prisoners are seeking; (2) presence of extremist ideologies; (3) presence of...
charismatic inmate leaders; (4) presence of extremist prison chaplains; (5) outreach programs by external extremist organizations that distribute extremist materials; (6) presence of terrorist “kingpins”, and (7) “virtual” presence by terrorist organizations.

In **Phase 3, self-identification** is likely to occur. Those vulnerable individuals who find themselves under the influence of the above mentioned situational/contextual factors and enablers, (1) begin to explore extremist ideologies/religions; (2) begin to gravitate away from their old identities, and (3) begin to associate themselves with like-minded extremists and adopt their ideology as their own.

In **Phase 4, indoctrination** follows, by (1) intensification of prisoner’s extremist beliefs and (2) follower/discipleship under extremist “indoctrinators”.

In **Phase 5, militancy**, those indoctrinated prisoners (1) adopt extremist ideology calling for violence against adversaries; (2) self-designate themselves as “warriors” for the cause, and (3) accept the duty to participate in violent activities.

In **Phase 6, post-prison-release terrorism** occurs. Individuals radicalized in prison, (1) join extremist “gateway” organization; (2) join terrorist cell, and (3) plan to conduct terrorist attack upon their release.

In **Phase 7, post-attack re-incarceration** takes place, if the extremist is not killed in the terrorist attack and is apprehended.

Most of the models that have been developed to describe radicalisation processes, in general, can be applied to explain prisoner radicalisation as well. For example, Dugas and Kruglanski (2014) discuss the implications of the significance quest model (Kruglanski et al., 2014) in relation to the risks of prison radicalisation.

2.2. What are the different pathways to and level of radicalisation? Do social networks play a significant role in this process?

2.2.1. Pathways to radicalisation
McGilloway, Ghosh, and Bhui (2015) examined the research on pathways and processes associated with radicalisation and extremism amongst Muslims living in Western societies (the group prioritized by counter-terrorism policy). Their review included 17 original qualitative or quantitative primary research published in peer-reviewed journals from all disciplines. Their conclusion is that “no single cause or pathway was implicated in radicalisation and violent extremism. Individuals may demonstrate vulnerabilities that increase exposure to radicalisation; however, the only common characteristic determined that terrorists are generally well-integrated, ‘normal’ individuals” (p. 39). Predisposing factors such as identity, social drivers, individual factors, mental health and personality pave the way to radicalisation. Critical initial contact, personal experiences, media and government influence, and grievances are precipitating factors leading those predisposed to take the next step.

**Predisposing factors**

1) **Identity.** The researchers found identity to be a dominant topic in the majority of the qualitative studies. Many Muslim participants in these studies reported that they became more aware of their Muslim identity due to confrontations of their identity in opposition to others that are not like them, that strengthened the ‘us and them’ delimitation. Having contact with non-Muslims was negatively associated with support for terrorism and was positively associated with identification with the UK, in a quantitative study (Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2009). Almost half of US Muslims reported a primary religious identification over a national identity. In the UK, belongingness to Britain over Islam was found to be significantly lower statistically, with 79.1% of those surveyed reporting their belongingness to their Islamic religion as very strong. However, strength of Islamic identity was not correlated with support or engagement in terrorist activities.

2) **Social drivers,** such as overcrowding, violence, and lack of integration may predispose to radical behaviour. Some British study participants believed that young Muslims are deviating from the ‘middle path’ due to lack of opportunities or...
community structure. Others believed that deprivation and discrimination are the structural factors that make young Muslims more vulnerable to extremist views. Research also pointed to the deprived areas, with high Muslim concentrations and working class backgrounds, where a low importance is given to British identity and an attitude of support for the 7/7 bombings is often found, as being the places were the majority of known UK terrorists come from.

3) **Individual factors.** Socio-economic class and age have been found to be negatively associated with the opinion that the 7/7 bombers were justified in their actions (however, this opinion does not suggest active terrorism involvement). Women were significantly more likely to hold this opinion. Almost half of the US terrorist case studies were born in the USA, but 66% of those involved in terrorism activity in the UK were second-generation Muslims of Pakistani background. Western citizenship in Islamic terrorist plots increased from 7.7% between 1993 and 1996 to 45.5% between 2004 and 2008. A US study looked at those involved in violent radicalisation between 2001 and 2010; 36 of 124 individuals involved in terrorist activity were Muslim converts. Of the 46 known terrorist plots, over 40% involved at least one of these 36 individuals. The authors of the study claim that there is a difference in the vulnerability of those who convert compared to those who do not, arguing predisposing factors such as low self-esteem and identity issues being more common in Muslim converts. They found that 59% of converts displayed such characteristics compared to only 10% of non-converts. Other study found that personal crises were the motivating factor for some religious conversions to Islam. One or more individuals involved in at least four of 27 US terrorist plots had converted to Islam in prison.

4) **Mental health and personality.** Mental health problems and self-esteem are two predisposing factors identified in studies, such as those conducted by Heinkel and Mace (2011) and Kleinmann (2012). James Elshafay, who was involved in a foiled plot to blow up a New York subway station, was dismissed by the US army after being deemed ‘disturbed’. He was noted to be a victim of childhood sexual abuse, used illicit
drugs and alcohol, and was diagnosed with depression and paranoid schizophrenia resulting in an admission to a mental health unit. Laguerre Payen, convicted of participating in a plot to bomb synagogues in New York, was also found to have schizophrenia. Iyman Faris who had been instructed to cut the cables of the Brooklyn Bridge by Al Qaeda had been recently discharged from a mental health unit following a suicide attempt. Jose Padilla had a personality disorder, Hosam Smadi was diagnosed with schizophrenia and dissocial personality disorder, Mohamad Alessa had an unidentified psychological disorder involving uncontrollable violent behaviour, and Martin Siraj had a borderline IQ of 78. However, these individuals made up only 7% of those involved in terrorism plots. In addition, external influences such as contact with Al Qaeda were also present in 19 out of 24 of these cases, and so health and personality alone are not considered sufficient to result in violent radicalisation.

Precipitating factors

1) **Critical initial contact.** Many of the individuals involved in terrorist plots have been found to have had recently experienced stressful life events such as divorce/separation or death (of a parent/child), resulting in an increased vulnerability to others’ enticement into extremist activity. 42% of US terrorist cases analyzed in a study were radicalized by social contacts such as friends or family. In the majority of cases, the individual being radicalized did not have contact with an influential cleric. One case where outside influence was minimal was in the creation of JIS (the Assembly of Authentic Islam), that was accountable for a foiled terrorist plot to targeted attacks in Los Angeles in 2005. JIS were a gang of Sunni Muslims at the New Folsom Prison in California USA, which has been formed using gang recruitment strategies, and radicalized through one-to-one communication between charismatic proselytizers and vulnerable inmates, isolated in prison from their families and friends. Limited religious offerings in prison, Imams being ‘out of touch’ with young Muslims, not valuing their needs and interests by neglecting to connect
teachings with citizenship are other precipitating factors research has found. A significant number of Imams not being able to speak English and prison chaplains not providing the support and direction needed lead disappointed young Muslims to turn to extremist groups such as JIS.

2) **Personal experiences.** A qualitative study found that around one quarter of Muslims reported being victims of discrimination secondary to their faith, where 15% felt others treated them with suspicion, 14% were verbally abused, and 5% were singled out by police officers. Institutional racism has also been pointed out by most of the participants in a focus group, with most having personal accounts of victimization in institutions such as educational systems, the workplace, or in legal settings. Two individuals (Hasan Akbar and Nidal Hasan) have been found to have used their personal experiences of racial abuse and oppression as reasoning for their terrorist attacks. Participants in two UK studies considered that Muslims are not able to feel like a British citizen, due to their commitments to their religion. Many Muslim interviewees felt that they were considered similar with terrorists despite the only association being that they share the same religion which is often seen by them as ‘evil’ and ‘backward’. Many felt that they were subjects to racial abuses from police officers. Almost two thirds of those from an ethnic minority background believed that they had been stopped and searched by police under the now banned Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, primarily because of their appearance, or because they ‘looked Muslim’. Other interviewees felt that these experiences of racism were not restricted to outside the Muslim community, and that Muslims were ‘looking inward at one another with suspicion, causing an element of distrust and apprehension’. Other ‘internal’ personal experiences were noted, such as the ‘second generational culture clash’ that Mohammad Sidique Khan, the ring leader of the 7/7 London bombings, had apparently encountered: he came into conflict with his parents over marrying a Muslim woman of Indian heritage. Such personal experiences are making individuals more vulnerable to involvement in violent extremism because extremist organizations such as Hizb-ul-Tahrir ‘give support in the face of increasing
Islamophobia, racism, the negative impact of geopolitical issues and social exclusion’. The results of a quantitative study showed that perceived discrimination predicted a reduction in participants ‘Western Approval’.

3) **Media and government influence.** The results of many UK studies revealed criticisms of government counter-terrorism policies. One study focused on the views of the Muslim community towards ‘Prevent’ part of the UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) to prevent people from supporting or becoming involved in terrorism via a community-led approach. The majority of study participants expressed concerns related to funding, intelligence gathering/spying and community confusion. Danish Muslim interviewees believed that their government was also misdirecting money to sources that did not influence combating terrorism. Police strategies were believed to have a disproportionate focus on Muslim communities, which can drive Muslims to isolate themselves further and become more active in expressing their contempt of authorities. A European cross-sectional survey showed that half the public believe there is a pressure from the USA to ‘step outside the law’ in dealing with terrorism, particularly in England and Norway. 68% of English participants in the survey believe that there is a real threat of terrorism and are of the opinion that new and tougher laws should be established to deal with the threat. In contrast, 64% of English Muslims believe that the threat is exaggerated and that current law should be re-enforced rather than the development of new legislation. Many studies showed that Muslim participants think that terminology used in both government and media depictions of Muslims and radicalisation is fuelling the misconception that violent extremism is rooted in Islam as a religion rather than political or societal issues. They believe that the media portrays distorted and prejudiced representations of Muslims, presenting them in a negative and villainous light. An observation was commonly made that criminal or terrorism activity undertaken by British white perpetrators did not result in them being labeled as ‘Christians’. The label ‘radical’ used in the government and the media is believed to be effective in suppressing broadminded yet influential individuals, labeling those who
do not accept all premises exhibited by the government (e.g. the criticism of foreign policy or military force), as radical extremists.

4) **Grievances.** Grievances were related to foreign policy, with reference to the suffering of the community of Islamic peoples. In several studies, Muslim extremist participants manifested a general understanding and sympathy for grievances that lead to engaging in violent extremism. Three terrorists convicted of the failed 2005 London bombings made specific reference to British foreign policy. One of them spoke about the ‘atrocities’ committed by the British government against ‘my people all over the world’ and justified his terrorist acts in terms of compensating the failure of the public’s protest. Another terrorist reported that it was his ‘personal responsibility to exact revenge by death on anyone who desecrated Islam’. At least 11 of the 27 US terrorist plots analyzed in a study found that at least one individual cited US military actions in the Middle East as reasoning for engagement in terrorism activity as revenge. In the US, a significant number of Muslims who participated in a poll believed the USA made a mistake in using military force in Afghanistan (48%) and Iraq (75%), with 8% reporting that suicide bombers were justified. In a UK survey, almost 23% agreed that the 7/7 bombings were justified, of which 11% strongly agreed. In Canada, 21% of participants in a survey believed that US occupation in Afghanistan was the right action, and 8% believing the same regarding Iraq. This quantitative study also found that such political grievances were deemed to be more significant in influencing the view of Western power, than personal experiences and individual discrimination. Anger and perceptions of injustice surrounding foreign policy are thought to be used by extremist organizations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir to draw young and discontented people into extremist views. Anger regarding the war in Iraq, grievance towards the society responsible for their imprisonment and also the personal experiences of inmates granted JIS, in Folston prison, a collective identity. Two surveys in Canada and the USA found an increased approval of terrorist affiliated organizations, such as Qa'ida, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Muslim brotherhood.
Perpetuating factors

1) **Interpretations and ideologies.** Studies have shown that factors such as lack of effective communication between young Muslims and non-radicalized Imams, perceptions of injustice due to foreign policy, a lack of alternative voices and vulnerable youth, are making young people susceptible to the influence of extremist groups. Younger generations seem more prone to seek literal interpretations of the Qur'an applicable to them, which they often found in extremist ideologies. The fear of being subject to suspicion often prevents non-extremists to proclaim the moderate teachings, and therefore radical views are left unquestioned. Often are utilized ideas and images that illustrate extreme opposition between Islam and the West ‘couched in terms that make defective use of Islamic religious vocabulary’. Often, ‘those who are ignorant about the teachings of Islam usually get trapped’. One study showed that extremist ideologies and negative attitudes towards non-Muslims are prevalent among Canadian Muslims. In around half of the US Islamic terrorists plots between 2001 and 2010 the driving force behind an individual’s engagement in violent extremism has been seemingly a desire to ‘defend the Islamic ideology to which they prescribed’. In one quarter of these plots, individuals were influenced by Anwar al-Awlaki’s pro-jihadi and propaganda teachings.

2) **In-group qualities.** Within the prison environment was found that JIS members crossed racial and gang lines to increase numbers, where former rivals, like the Crips and Bloods, ‘are joining forces under Islamic banners’. The processes and mentality that drive gang culture were believed to be driving the same security and collective identity in being part of the extremist group. In cases where those radicalized were met by extremist recruiters, the process of radicalisation was completed slowly and in groups.

3) **Methods of persuasion.** Extremists present the Muslim youth an image of Islam being at the opposite end with the West, with no middle ground. The sense of unity, security and belonging associated with being part of the ‘us’ rather than ‘them’ invite young
Muslims sensible to radicalisation messages to feel needed and personally involved. Case studies indicate that those who recruit were found not only to be charismatic but also to have a vast knowledge of Islam which was ‘attractive’ to recruits. It was said about the JIS leader, Kevin James, that his ‘piousness was central to his charismatic appeal’. Prisoners spoke of his ability to remain calm and collected despite pressures that caused others to crumble. Chaplains reported that JIS members ‘pressured’ and ‘encouraged’ conversion to Islam and defiance against authorities. One study showed that discontent, such as that surrounding foreign policy, was amplified and combined with jihadist verses from the Qur’an. Within the prison context, an individual and an organizational level of radicalisation have been identified, where the individual level consisted of one-to-one proselytization and the organization level was established from a gang model. Kevin James was found to ‘encapsulate JIS’s collective grievance in prison gang culture, thereby fusing JIS’s spiritual identity onto its gang history, which was already predisposed towards violence’.

Pathways to Islamist radicalisation

Evidence to an inquiry of British Home Affairs Select Committee (2012) revealed four main pathways to or drivers of Islamist radicalisation (which they define as “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism”, p. 3). The four pathways are: ideology, theology, grievance and mental health problems. The Committee detailed these four pathways in the following lines (p. 118):

1) **Ideology** – a belief in a world view where the west is at war with Islam. The selective observation of political issues as grievances leads to accepting the plausibility of violent ideologies as normal and appropriate to the world. This then sees extremist ideology as the only ideology and a reading of religious texts that are consonant and resonate with the world as it is. These individuals are often not drawn to the theology of Wahhabi jihadism, but to the political project and activities as being a manifestation of fighting the war against Islam that is being perpetrated by the West. Whether it is
the cartoons, the wars in geo-political East, or one of the myriad other examples cited, they are all viewed as examples of this. Acts of terror are seen in the same light; as a response to this war—intellectual, political, and military. The way to engage such people in our experience is not to immediately challenge the theology, but to get them to see the world in a more nuanced manner; the media, parliamentary debate and policy, government decisions, wars etc are all not “for or against” Muslims. If this is done, then the framework of thinking within which the world is viewed is comprehensively changed. This change then necessitates a more nuanced approach to the religious texts, and it begins to make more sense that such an approach should exist. Hence, this route is a mixture of grievances viewed through a specific narrative, and an ideological view of Islam and terrorism.

2) Theological terrorism – there are individuals who have a full-blown belief that Islamist ideology is the only valid political reality that Muslims can accept. They believe terrorism is a form of Jihad to remove governments and their supporters i.e. “The West” from Muslim majority countries or what they would refer to as “Muslim lands”. These are specific, theologically driven aims, and they believe that they have an authentic reading of medieval Islamic scripture. This category of people can only be engaged by people with the relevant theological expertise to demonstrate that the views held are inauthentic and are a heterodox reading of scripture. After first dealing with the specific issue of violence, the underpinning mindset can only be engaged by demonstrating the pluralism within Islam, and the diverse nature of Islamic thought; this is a detailed, and specific theological engagement.

3) Grievance – there are individuals in the UK of Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani origin, who have had grievous experiences. These experiences, often of violence; traumatic loss of family members; “collateral damage” involving our troops; or personal experiences of treatment in the UK, makes these individuals personally susceptible to violent ideology. These individuals are often motivated by a sense of moral indignation. Engaging with such people can be difficult. In our experience it requires:
management of the emotions and allowing them to be expressed and justified; allowing the moral reaction and building upon it (i.e. civilians being hurt does not allow civilians being attacked); developing a sense of moral rectitude and re-enforcing this by addressing the theological justifications; and building resilience on human rights, morality, and theological principles over a period of time.

4) Those with mental health problems – whether minor or major – are targets and easily vulnerable. This is why mainstream services identifying such people in partnership with initiatives are so important. Dealing with the arguments, isolating the individuals, placing them in safer spaces, dealing with the causes the mental health state, are all part of the resolution as well as specialized interventions; mainstream services play a major role.

2.2.2. Levels and mechanisms of radicalisation

One of the most comprehensive frameworks that describes in detail the levels and mechanisms of radicalisation associated to each level is SMA/McCauley’s (2012) “Two Pyramids” Framework. Figure 4 illustrates the two pyramids of the framework representing the opinion and action states that characterize individuals within a given population relative to a particular cause.

Within this framework, radicalisation is viewed as a process that influences movement between opinion states, while mobilization is a process that influences movement between action states. Each pyramid is composed of four layers that correspond to varying levels of radicalisation and mobilization, respectively. The main assumption of this framework, in contrast to the phase models that are sequential, is that individuals can exist at any stage in each of the pyramids and move within the pyramids.

Figure 4. SMA/McCauley “Two Pyramids” Framework (Source: Orilina & Desjardins, 2012, p. 14)
Within this framework, **radicalisation** is viewed as a **process that influences movement between opinion states**, while mobilisation is a process that influences movement between action states. Each pyramid is composed of four layers that correspond to varying levels of radicalisation and mobilisation, respectively. The main assumption of this framework, in contrast to the phase models that are sequential, is that individuals can exist at any stage in each of the pyramids and move within the pyramids.

The layers of the opinion pyramid are organized as follows:

- **Neutrals** (green): Individuals who do not believe their group or cause is under attack and, thus, see no need for violent action;

- **Sympathizers** (yellow): Individuals who believe their group or cause is under attack, but oppose violent action for moral or practical reasons;

- **Justifiers** (orange): Individuals who believe their group or cause is under attack and consider that violent action is justified;
- **Personal Moral Obligation** (red): Individuals who feel personally obligated to defend their group or cause.

Similarly, the layers of the action pyramid are the following:

- **Inert** (light pink): Individuals who do not participate in any form of political action;
- **Legal activists** (pink): Individuals who participate in doing, planning, or financing legal political action (non-violent);
- **Radicals/illegal activists** (red): individuals who participate in doing, planning, or financing illegal political action (violent or non-violent);
- **Terrorists** (red): individuals who participate in doing, planning, or financing violent acts targeting civilians.

The two-pyramid framework states that the individuals occupy both the opinion and action spaces simultaneously. For example, an individual can be a justifier in terms of opinion and a radical in terms of action. Thus, according to this framework, there are 16 initial opinion-action states (see Figure 5).

**Figure 5. The 16 opinion-action states described by the SMA/McCauley Two Pyramids framework (Source: Orlina & Desjardins, 2012, p. 16)**
These 16 basic states take place within a context shaped up by a variety of factors that operate as activators and catalysts. Individuals’ exposure to activating factors favours the transition from one state to another. The framework describes two types of factors that influence any transition between layers. The first type of factors represents the activators or catalysts that contribute to further radicalisation or mobilization. The second category represents the inhibitors or interventions that prevent an individual from moving up to the higher levels of the pyramids. These transition factors can be characterized as follows:

- **Activators**: Internal factors that facilitate movement within or between layers of the pyramids;
- **Catalysts**: External factors that facilitate movement within or between layers of the pyramids;
- **Inhibitors**: Factors unique to an individual that prevent progression to the higher levels of the pyramids;
- **Interventions**: External factors inserted into a situation that prevent progression to the higher levels of the pyramids or reverse it.

These transition factors interact with one another and may vary in their effects over time. The Two Pyramids model identifies eleven principal transition factors: sacred values; belongingness/power of love; social isolation; grievance; emotions; anomie/uncertainty; reward/pleasure seeking; personal tragedy or trauma; narratives and memes; social movements; financial incentives.

In addition to the transition factors, the framework specifies that there are certain “shaping factors” (aspects of an individual’s environment), such as cultural values, genetic background, and access to technology, that condition whether and how transition factors play a role in their movement between radicalisation states or levels of engagement in action.
The Two Pyramids framework specifies that radicalisation and mobilization processes involve complex interactions between transition and shaping factors. For example, “an individual may experience a threat to strongly held sacred value, but whether that experience leads to a transition to a higher radicalisation state (a higher tier on the opinion pyramid) may depend on whether the person also holds a grievance against the offending entity (a transition factor) as well as whether the person is embedded in a network of relationships with people whose attitudes mitigate the perceived offense (a shaping factor)” (p. 18).
3. What are the main theories that try to explain violent extremism?

In the past twenty years, scholars from various disciplines have attempted to offer valid theoretical explanations that can account for the processes of radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. Therefore, a large amount of such explanations is available at the moment. In fact, Orlina and Desjardins (2012) reckon that there are as many as twenty different theories that have been applied to the study of radicalisation. Crossett and Spitaletta (2010) summarize sixteen such theories. Other literature reviews that provide an overview of the most commonly used explanatory theories in the field of radicalisation are those by Victoroff (2005), Davis and Cragin (2009), Borum (2011a), and Nasser-Edine and colleagues (2011).

In the next section, we will summarize some of the theories that are most relevant for the understanding of prisoner radicalisation.

3.1. Transformative Learning Theory

Transformative Learning Theory (Mezirow, 1991) is a promising framework for understanding the processes of personal change associated with radicalisation. This understanding is crucial because radicalisation is essentially a process of change, in which non-violent individuals come to accept and promote violent action. This is also particularly relevant when applied to the prison context because the newly entered inmates have to learn to adapt to the new harsh environment. This theoretical framework provides an understanding of how personal factors from phase 1 of Sinai’s (2014) model of prisoner radicalisation are activated as starters in the radicalisation process and how the progression to phase 3 – self-identification – is likely to develop.

The transformative learning process develops through three main phases: the trigger phase, the process of changing phase, in which the deconstruction and reconstruction of
meaning perspectives and identity take place, and the outcome phase, in which new meaning perspectives give rise to new behavior.

Wilner and Dubouloz (2010, p. 22) suggest that “while the radicalisation process is triggered by strong social, political, and environmental forces, individual radicalisation takes place during the changing phase in which a combination of personal reflection, knowledge acquirement, and identity reassessment occurs. Violent behaviour takes place in the final phase and is a reflection of the solidification of the individual’s new identity, values, and belief system”.

Mulcahy, Merrington, and Bell (2013) use this theoretical framework to understand the changes prisoners go through while incarcerated and how this learning transformation renders them more vulnerable to radical extremists. Mulcahy and colleagues explain that when the inmates experience the crisis of imprisonment – which in terms of transformative learning theory represents a trigger – they try to make sense of the situation using their habitual ways of thinking. However, when they fail to manage the situation, they become aware that they cannot resort anymore to their habitual ways to help them. This represents a meaning distortion to which the prisoners react by critical reflection and by exploring new experiences, such as turning to religion for guidance. The new behaviours, roles, and relationships that they develop as a consequence help them to cope with the demands of the new environment and learn how to get past the crisis. Therefore, Mulcahy et al. (2013, p. 8) point out that transformative learning theory “can help shed light on the process and precursors of prison radicalisation. Individual radicalisation is not only associated with particular socio-political contexts (e.g. prison) and personal characteristics but is also a combination of reflection, knowledge acquisition and identity reassessment. As individuals begin to develop self-doubt or experience confusion over identity or intense personal debate, eventually a point is reached whereby the individual comes to the realisation that their old identity no longer exists and a new one must be established. Therefore, when radicalized individuals socialise and are validated by other 'likeminded' individuals, their transformation is reinforced and the new identity is
strengthened. Ultimately, those individuals who become violent, radicalized inmates not only justify their actions but such actions are also expected among the greater group of radicals”.

3.2. Identity Theory

Identity Theory (Erikson, 1968) postulates that identity formation is crucial to an individual’s psychosocial development and is characterized by a succession of crises, each to be resolved in order for the individual’s personality to become fully integrated. Failure to resolve these crises manifests itself in maladaptive ways in later life. Crenshaw (1986) has described Erikson’s theory in the following lines, with regard to terrorism: “At the stage of identity formation, individuals seek both meaning and a sense of wholeness or completeness as well as what Erikson . . . terms ‘fidelity’, a need to have faith in something or someone outside oneself as well as to be trustworthy in its service. Ideologies then are guardians of identity. Erikson further suggests that political undergrounds utilize youth’s need for fidelity as well as the ‘store of wrath’ held by those deprived of something in which to have faith. A crisis of identity (when the individual who finds self-definition difficult is suffering from ambiguity, fragmentation, and contradiction) makes some adolescents susceptible to ‘totalism’ or to totalistic collective identities that promise certainty. In such collectivities the troubled young finds not only an identity but an explanation for their difficulties and a promise for the future (p. 391-392). In a similar vein, Crosset and Spitaletta (2010) argue that “an application of Erickson’s theory claims that candidates for radicalisation are young people who either lack self-esteem or who have a need to consolidate their identities. If an individual lacks self-esteem, joining a radical group might function as a strong identity stabilizer, providing the individual with the elusive positive identity. Those with identity confusion may be consumed by a sense of isolation and thus view association (even if it is with a negative identity) as a positive social act. Identity-starved individuals are also hypothesized to be motivated by a desire to embrace the intimate tutelage of a charismatic leader – a form of choosing a love object who resembles a parent.” (p. 30).
3.3. Social identity theory

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) contributes to the study of radicalisation by offering an understanding of “the socio-psychological dynamics occurring at the micro-level during the process of moving from moderate views, to extremists views, to terrorist actions on an individual level (personal identity) and how the group and cultural identities are defined, refined or redefined within that process” (Keys-Turner, 2011, p. 25). According to Social Identity Theory, the group is a source of self-esteem for individual members (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Goldman (2014) explains that „individuals who perceive their future to be bleak and uncertain are more likely to attempt to belong to a group because the group provides a script for how people should behave and what to think, thereby reducing uncertainty. Additionally, the more uncertain one is, the higher the chances that the individual will seek a group higher in entitativity – i.e., a group that appears cohesive, clearly structured, and distinct from other entities. This can make ‘extreme groups’ (e.g., cults, terrorists, gangs) more appealing and attractive as they provide individuals with a more rigidly defined, highly prescriptive social identity. Accordingly, joining a terrorist organisation is largely a group phenomenon. This is supported by numerous cases where the most common methods to radicalise and recruit prisoners were through gangs or religion in prisons” (p. 50).

3.4. Social learning theory

Social learning theory of aggression has been offered by Bandura (1998) as an explanation of violent extremists’ actions. One basic assumption of this theory is that individuals who witness violence regularly seek to imitate the aggressive model they have learned. This is an alternative explanation of violent behavior that emerges not as the consequence of innate aggressiveness but “of cognitive “reconstrual” of moral imperatives” (Victoroff, 2005, p. 18). Applied to prisoner radicalisation, social learning theory suggests that prisoners who come from a culture that glorifies violent extremism
or those who are exposed to extremist role models are more likely to engage in extremist violence.

### 3.5. Rational choice theory

Rational choice theory regards violent extremists as rational actors and explains their decision to be involved in violence in terms of cost-benefit analysis. The extremist weighs alternative actions, means and ends, costs and benefits, and chooses the alternative whose benefits outweigh its costs while achieving his political objectives (Crenshaw, 1998). In other words, people choose violent extremism because they think that it is the best available option to affect the desired change. For detailed explanatory and empirical accounts of the rational choice model in the context of violent extremism see Taylor (1993); Crenshaw (1998); Gupta (2008); Berrebi (2009); Perry and Hasisi (2015); Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005).

### 3.6. Social Movement Theory

Social Movement Theory can contribute a necessary theoretical framework for understanding how the contextual factors from the phase two of Sinai’s (2014) model of radicalisation enable vulnerable inmates to move further in the processes of radicalisation into violent extremism. It provides a top-down approach on individual radicalisation. A social movement represents “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (Zald & McCarthy, 1987 as cited in Borum, 2011a, p. 11). Social movement theory is based on strain theory which postulates the idea that mobilization to violent extremism is “a response to the amount of strains and stresses encountered by a particular society: the more people feel frustrated and alienated, the more likely they are to join groups that resist the perceived sources of their frustration” (Neumann & Rogers, 2008, p. 14). Klandermans and Oegema (1987) state that any social movement
involves four distinct practices: forming mobilization potentials, forming and motivating recruitment networks, arousing motivation to participate, and removing barriers to participation. The individuals who become participants in a social movement get motivated while going through the phases of becoming part of the mobilization potential and becoming the target of mobilization attempts. Further, motivation and barriers interact with each other to give rise to participation: the more motivated people are the higher the barriers they can overcome (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). The recruitment of new members to the cause represents a rational endeavor; recruiters strategically seek out individuals who show the greatest potential to further the cause (Borum, 2011a). The process of recruitment has been conceptualized by Brady, Schlozman, and Verba (1999) as having two phases. In the first phase, the recruiter seeks information regarding the prospect, such as past activities the targeted individual has been involved in. Also, the recruiter tries to find whether or not the individual possesses some desired characteristics that might make him or her prone to be involved in extremist actions. The amount and quality of the information recruiters obtain depends a lot on their relationship with the targeted recruit. In the second phase “recruiters offer information on participatory opportunities and deploy inducements to persuade recruits to say ‘yes’” (Borum, 2011a, p. 17). In order to obtain participation, those recruiters who have control over desired resources offer the potential recruit various incentives and rewards in order to persuade him to join the cause (Brady et al., 1999). Mulcahy and colleagues (2013) have applied social movement theory to prisoner radicalisation by prison gangs. They maintain that “prisoners prior to incarceration who are affiliated with a certain gang may therefore naturally gravitate towards similar gang organizations in prison where members have each other’s backs. Prison gangs know that prisons have limited resources and, as a result, they flourish within prisons despite the best efforts of corrections officials—and extremist gangs are no exception”.

3.7. Group dynamics theories
Group dynamics theories, from the field of social psychology, are of great value in explaining group dynamics involved in the contextual forces that have an impact on individual’s trajectory towards violent extremism, which is most often a group-related phenomenon (Borum, 2011a). Borum (2011a) describes the following key mechanisms (p. 20):

- **Group contexts cultivate extreme attitudes**: Individual opinions and attitudes tend to become more extreme in a group context. Group opinions and attitudes also tend to be more extreme than those held by its individual members, a phenomenon often referred to as "group polarization."

- **Group decision making is often more biased and less rational than individual decision making**: The phenomenon—popularly referred to as "groupthink"—is one in which group members attempt excessively to reach an agreement, to the point where the need for consensus overrides the goal of making the most appropriate decision.

- **Group perceptions are colored by group membership, often called the "in-group/out-group bias"**: People tend to identify and classify in-group member behaviors more positively, and to make more positive attributions about them. Others outside the group (including other groups) are identified as having more negative traits and behaviors.

- **Individuals feel less responsible for "group" actions**: Individuals may feel less personally answerable, by diffusing accountability over the entire group. If an individual acts violently within the context—or in the name—of a group, the mere presence of the group may diminish his perceived agency and therefore lower the acceptable threshold for violent behavior.

- **People join groups because of perceived incentives and rewards**: The incentives to join a group are dynamic and variable across different individuals. Some persons are primarily seeking social affiliation or a personal sense of meaning. Others may be on a quest for excitement or—more practically—a way to get food, shelter, and meet their basic needs for survival.
Groups have *internal norms and rules that control member behavior*: They have implicit and explicit expectations for what individual members think and how they behave. They leverage the social pressure of these expectations to get members to conform. When groups are more cohesive, more isolated, or invoke high costs for dissent, group conformity is even stronger, and conditions for compliance/obedience are elevated as well.
4. How do the official institutions respond to violent extremism?

Colin Murray (2014, p. 29) argues that “the threat of prison radicalisation has often been presented as a caricatured process whereby imprisoned terrorist masterminds whisper in the ears of their fellow inmates whilst the prison authorities watch on, helpless in the face of human rights restrictions”. The truth is that prison authorities are making important efforts to constrain prisoner radicalisation.

RAN Collection document provides a number of key insights that apply to all institutional approaches, also referred to as the RAN DNA:

**Prevention is key:** it is crucial to invest in interventions that are aimed at removing the breeding ground for radicalisation to prevent these processes or stop them as early as possible.

**Involving and training first line practitioners is key:** these practitioners will be the first professional point of contact for individuals at risk. To be able to have a preventative approach, they need to be aware of signals of radicalisation, know how to seek support to address these signals whilst maintaining a positive relationship with the individual.

**Multi-agency approach is key:** To be able to prevent radicalisation and to safeguard individuals at risk, multi agency cooperation is necessary to provide a consistent and reliable network. In this network, expertise and information can be shared, cases can be discussed and there can be agreement and shared ownership on the best course of action. These networks should be combinations between law enforcement, professional care organisations as well as NGO’s and community representatives.

**Tailor made interventions, adapted to local circumstances, are key:** each individual at risk is different which calls for a case-by-case approach. It is important to understand the individuals’ background, grievances, motivations, fears, frustrations etc. to be able to develop a suitable intervention. Besides internal factors, external factors
such as the individual’s social environment and other local circumstances need to be taken into account to provide effective support.

In recent years, the de-radicalisation and reintegration of convicted terrorists have become one of the most rapidly developing areas in the area of countering violent extremism. Over the last decade (and some far before that), several countries have introduced policies to manage and facilitate the re-entry process of extremist prisoners back into society (e.g. in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka). Most experts agree that this specific group of prisoners requires special attention, as it poses unique (management) challenges to the corrections system whilst incarcerated as well as to society during reintegration. However, there are significant knowledge gaps relating to the extent of the problem of radicalisation and violent extremist contagion in prison, as well as the risk of recidivism among released extremist offenders.

Given the institutional, methodological and financial challenges, where should correction systems focus their attention on in order to obtain relevant data that will inform the development and implementation of more effective interventions and policy measures? The answer – though for sure not the complete solution as such – is appropriate risk assessment tools and procedures. Risk assessments for violent extremists are intended to identify the risks, motivations, criminogenic needs and vulnerabilities of violent extremists at a given point in time and within a given context. Importantly, risk assessment needs to happen not only as part of the intake process but be repeated periodically or whenever specific events require it, in order to assess changes in thought and behaviour over time and implement interventions and policy measures accordingly. As such, these assessments can also help to assess the success rate of certain interventions and rehabilitation programmes. Similarly, violent extremism risk assessment tools may be applied to those “ordinary” offenders that are suspected of becoming radicalised whilst incarcerated.
5. Why are prisons a breeding ground for radicalisation? What recruitment tactics are employed within the prison environment?

5.1. Why are prisons a breeding ground for radicalisation?

Prisoner radicalisation is not a recent and new phenomenon. It is thought to be as old as prisons are (Hamm, 2011). Examples of renowned personalities who were radicalized during their time in prison include Gandhi, Mandela, Churchill, Stalin and Hitler (Silke, 2014a; Hamm, 2011). While some of them ended up committing acts of violence against innocent people, the others are known as the greatest leaders of modern times. Therefore, as Hamm (2013, p. 14) states: “prisoner radicalisation is still a double-edged sword: prison can produce both freedom fighters, who struggle for economic and social justice by nonviolent means, and terrorists, who use violence to cause a change in the social order”.

Those authors who have portrayed prisons as “fertile soil for jihad” (Dunleavy, 2011), “incubators of jihadist thought” (Brandon, 2009), or “incubators for terrorism” (Pantucci, 2009), base their argument on the increased number of well known terrorists who is thought that have become radicalized into violent extremism while incarcerated in prisons.

There are a number of well-documented cases of inmates who have been radicalized in prison and then attempted to commit terrorist attacks. Some of the more commonly cited cases include:

Richard Reid, the so-called “Shoe Bomber”, convicted for attempting to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami, in 2001, with explosives in his shoes, converted to Sunni Islam while incarcerated in a British young offenders’ institution for
a series of muggings during the mid-1990s (Hamm, 2011). Officials suspect he was radicalized by clerics who preached at the prison (Seper, 2004).

**Jose Padilla**, the so-called “Dirty Bomber”, an American-born citizen who was convicted of plotting a radiological bomb attack in the US, converted to Islam in a U.S. prison where he had been influenced by a free-world imam (Brandon, 2009; Hamm, 2007).

**José Emilio Suárez Trashorras**, “a Spanish mineworker, was not religious or politically aware when he was jailed in 2001 for a drug offense. Incarcerated in the same prison was Jamal Ahmidan, a young Moroccan living in Spain, also convicted of a petty crime. Once in prison, however, both the nominally Christian Trashorras and the nonobservant Muslim Ahmidan enthusiastically embraced radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs and were recruited into an al-Qaeda-linked Moroccan terrorist group, Takfir wa al-Hijra. The imprisoned Ahmidan quickly gained a leadership position in the cellblock, and on emerging from prison both men were absorbed into an extensive and well-organized radical Islamic organization that trafficked heavily in drugs to support its terrorist activities. Later, Ahmidan led the cell that carried out the Madrid bombings, while Trashorras supplied the explosives and helped plant the 13 backpack bombs that killed 191 people and injured hundreds of others on four Madrid trains crowded with early-morning commuters.” (Cuthberston, 2004, p. 15).

**Khalid Kelkal** was radicalised in a French prison in the early 1990s. He was recruited by radical Algerians. He was involved in the murder of a moderate imam in Paris and in the attempted bombing of the high-speed rail link between Paris and Lyon (Neumann, 2010).

**Kevin James** formed a militant group called Jam’yyat Il-Islam Is-Saheed (JIS - Authentic Assembly of God) in 1997 in a California state prison. Seven years later, he was recruiting prisoners who were instructed to attack US military recruiting stations, synagogues, and other targets. **Levar Washington**, an accomplice of James, met him in prison in 2004 and was also a member of JIS (Hamm, 2012).
Kevin Gardner (Abbas Shafiq) turned towards violent extremism during his incarceration in a Young Offenders’ Institution in England in 2006-2007. He became obsessed with the British Army and plotted an attack on a military base from within his cell (Neumann, 2010).

Muktar Ibrahim, the leader of the 2005 London bomb plot, adopted extreme Islamist ideologies during the time he spent in prison in the mid-1990s and has been further radicalized at mosques he began attending after he was released (Brandon, 2009; Neumann, 2010).

Another case in Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is often discussed not as an example of prisoner radicalized during incarceration, but as an illustration of the impact prison can have on individuals who left from prison more dangerous and hard-lined then they were when they entered. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of Al Qaeda, is a former extremist prisoner. Silke (2014b) describes al-Zawahiri and the impact of prison experiences on the shaping of his extremist profile in the following terms: “He was arrested and imprisoned in Egypt in the early 1980s because he had links with the assassins of the Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat. While incarcerated he was brutally tortured. Zawahiri was already a radical before he entered prison, but when he emerged he had become even more committed to the cause and considerably more dangerous and powerful. His prison experience served only to harden his zeal; he became a leader among his fellow prisoners and emerged as a prominent spokesman for the cause. Upon release he assumed the overall leadership of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, committing that movement to a campaign of extreme violence, and ultimately merging the organisation with Al Qaeda in the 1990s. Prison did not reform Ayman al-Zawahiri, it did not rehabilitate him and it certainly failed to de-radicalise him. It only succeeded in making him more dangerous.” (p. 108).

According to RAN P&P (2016), the prison environment is a potential breeding ground for radicalisation due to the following risks: recruitment of other prisoners; supporting extremist groups from prison; getting support from extremist groups outside...
The European Union programme for education, training, youth and sport 2014-2020

prison; preparing for violent extremist/ideological inspired illegal acts after release; hostility to other groups of prisoners and/or staff; becoming more radicalised because of grievances/frustrations/anger related to being in prison.

Neumann (2010) identifies two main reasons that underline the danger of prison radicalisation. The first is that “prison brings together politically motivated offenders, including terrorists, with ‘ordinary’ criminals, creating the potential for an ‘unholy alliance’ between the two. Instead of reducing the risk of terrorism, prison may thus help to produce an even more serious threat by combining the terrorists’ ideological fervour with ‘ordinary’ offenders’ criminal energy and skills. It is this concern – among others – which underlies the dilemma between ‘concentrating’ imprisoned terrorists or allowing them to mix with ‘ordinary’ criminals” (p. 26). The second reason is that prisons are places of vulnerability in which individuals experience social isolation and personal crises (due to their separation from their families and friends, the need to confront their past and to find a new way to live and function in the current hostile environment), both of which are important contributors to one’s responsiveness to extremist messages. Therefore, individuals are more likely to be radicalized into violent extremism in these places.

5.2. Recruitment tactics that are employed within the prison environment

Within prisons, radical recruiters employ specific tactics in order to attract potential followers to their cause, capitalizing on the most pressuring needs of vulnerable prisoners, such as the need for physical protection, the need for social support, the need for meaningful identity, the need to belong, etc. In the following section, we will summarize some of these recruitment tactics.

a. Offering (physical) protection and social support

This report has been accomplished during the project Radicalization Prevention in Prisons (2015-1-PT01-KA204-013062), implemented with financial support of the European Commission by the Erasmus + Programme. This publication reflects the views only of the authors. The Portuguese National Agency ERASMUS+ Education and Training and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
Cellblocks serve as areas that are difficult to reach even by prison officials, so small cells can operate with relative ease in asserting their influence over the prisoners in those areas” (Sinai, 2014, p.41). Therefore, there are different types of extremist social networks in the prison, such as religious- or ideology-based gangs, that provide the physical protection and social support that prisoners are seeking. Most prisoners who join Islamic gangs for protection adopt Islam temporarily out of necessity, a phenomenon called “Prislam” by officials of the New York Police Department (Cilluffo et al., 2006). “Prislam,” consists of cliques that use cut-and-paste versions of the Qur'an to give a religious justification to their violent behaviour (Hamm, 2008). “This form of ‘Jailhouse Islam’ is unique to prison because it incorporates into the religion the values of gang loyalty and violence” (Sinai, 2014, p. 41).

b. Offering identities of defiance

Most prisoners are angry about their incarceration and perceive the authorities as enemies. Many of them hold deep anti-government sentiments. Therefore, they start to entertain and become animated by the desire to defy the authorities. These individuals are more receptive to messages that promote anti-social and anti-state violence (Brandon, 2009; Hamm, 2008).

c. Offering meaning and identity

Prisoners are especially susceptible to radicalisation attempts because they are “captive audiences” (Cilluffo, 2006). That means they are socially isolated, alienated and separated from their typical social networks (Cilluffo, Cardash, & Whitehead, 2007; Neumann, 2010). Many of them experience severe personal crises (Hamm, 2009). These vulnerabilities often drive them to explore new belief systems, to seek a meaning, and establish an identity (Cilluffo et al., 2007; Hamm, 2008; Neumann, 2010). Therefore, extremists of all kinds, prey on these vulnerabilities by offering them meaning and identity (Cilluffo et al., 2007). Hamm and Ammar (2015) suggest that extremists offer such prisoners “identities of resistance”, who are thought to be “a primary catalyst for
inmate conversions to a range of Islamic traditions, including Islamist orientations that may espouse ideologies of intolerance and violence. Foremost among them is the amorphous social movement called Salafism—the narrow, strict, puritanical form of Sunni Islam upon which al-Qaeda is based—and Prison Islam groups that are known for using religious medallions and tattoos, along with selective verses from the Quran, to draw recruits from gang subcultures. Once radicalized by these extremist beliefs, prisoners become vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.” (p. 4).

d. Offering feelings of belonging

Research has shown that within any social environment, the need to belong to a group is exacerbated by individual characteristics, such as being young and unemployed, feeling alienated and desiring to feel important (Baumeister, & Leary, 1995). These characteristics are quite common among prisoners (Cilluffo et al., 2006). Furthermore, “being part of the ‘us’ rather than ‘them’ may invite particular groups of young Muslims to feel needed and personally involved” (McGilloway et al., 2015, p. 48).

5.3. Models of Recruitment

Gerwehr and Daley (2006, as cited in Mulcahy et al., 2013) have proposed four models of recruitment, as described in figure 6: a) the Net; b) the Funnel; c) the Infection, and d) the Seed Crystal. The net model is representative of the situation when the target group is homogeneous, equally engaged and, therefore can be approached with a single move. The funnel model is representative of a gradual approach, focusing on the transformation of an individual from a target to a dedicated group member, through significant identity changes. The infection model describes an approach when a trusted recruiter is infiltrated into the target population to gain followers through direct personal appeals; infection works best when the targeted group is composed of individuals who are not extremists, but who are dissatisfied. Finally, the seed crystal model represents the approach employed when the targeted population is very difficult to access and open recruitment is difficult, such as prisons (Mulcahy et al., 2013).
Figure 6. Gerwehr and Daley’s four models of recruitment (Source: Mulcahy et al, 2013, p. 9): a) the Net; b) the Funnel; c) the Infection, and d) the Seed Crystal.
6. What are the main indicators on how to identify vulnerable people at risk of radicalisation?

In addressing this question we will, again, focus on the prison population and take a top-down approach in identifying prisoners at risk of radicalisation. That is, we will start by examining the characteristics of violent extremist offenders and then continue with the characteristics of prisoners at risk to become violent extremists.

The experts in the field established so far that “terrorism is not the same as other types of crime and terrorists are not typical criminals. Inevitably many terrorists and violent extremists end up in prison where they can pose formidable challenges. Such prisoners are unusual and distinctive. As a consequence, their management can pose exceptionally difficult problems in prison and probation settings.” (Silke, 2014a, p. 3).

In order to distinguish violent extremists from ordinary criminals, one should consider three important aspects (Hoffman, 2006): (a) like terrorists, criminals use violence as a means to attain a specific goal, but they their motivation is usually selfish, material gain; terrorists have usually altruistic purposes: they believe that they are serving a “good” cause designed to achieve a greater good for a larger group of people; (b) the criminal is not concerned with influencing or affecting public opinion; by contrast, the fundamental aim of the terrorist’s violence is, ultimately, to change “the system”; (c) the terrorist is also very different from the “lunatic assassin”: whereas the terrorist’s goal is political (to change a political system through his violent act), the lunatic assassin’s goal is often completely egocentric and deeply personal. These differences are reasons to expect that violent extremist offenders will differ from the mainstream offender population.

Recently, Skillicorn, Leuprecht, Stys, and Gobeil (2015) conducted an important qualitative study focused on the differences in the two types of offenders. They found detectable, but very small, differences between violent extremist offenders and the wider offender population. Violent extremist offenders did not form distinct clusters, but the
data indicated that a set of attributes exists that would generate such a clustering. The results showed that violent extremist offenders are not significantly different from one another, even when they were involved in the same incident(s). “In particular, violent extremists show the same strong separation visible in the mainstream population between those who are motivated and use instrumental violence in support of their ideology, and those whose participation seems much less principled and much more opportunistic” (p. 17). Figure 7 shows the attributes most strongly associated with differences between the two groups.

Figure 7. The attributes most strongly associated with differences between violent extremist offenders and mainstream offender population (Source: Skillicorn et al., 2015, p. 9)
Many of these attributes describe personal and community functioning, as well as properties associated with employment difficulties. The researchers concluded that these attributes vary between these two major clusters, but they could not specify in which direction. Skillicorn and colleagues (2015) also wanted to know if offenders at risk of radicalisation could be identified by their similarities to known violent extremist offenders, but the results showed that the differences among radicalised offenders were as large as those among offenders in general, so it has not been possible to use similarity to identify those at risk for radicalisation.

Monahan (2012) has reviewed the evidence regarding individual risk factors for terrorism and concluded: „from the existing research, therefore, it appears that none of the four overlapping dimensions of the risk of common violence identified by Kroner et al (2005)—criminal history, an irresponsible lifestyle, psychopathy and criminal attitudes, and substance abuse—characterize those who commit violent terrorism. In addition, there is little empirical evidence supporting the validity of other putative risk factors for terrorism beyond what is already obvious (i.e., age, gender, and perhaps marital status). Indeed, the strongest empirical findings are entirely negative: terrorists, in general, tend not to be impoverished or mentally ill or substance abusers or psychopaths or otherwise criminal; suicidal terrorists tend not to be clinically suicidal. In no society studied to date have personality traits been found to distinguish those who engage in terrorism from those who refrain from it.” (p. 11).

However, there are some scholars and experts who have attempted to provide inventories of predisposing factors that might serve as indicators on how to identify individuals at risk of radicalisation.

For example, Horgan (2008) has listed six predisposing risk factors for involvement in terrorism:

1) **Emotional vulnerability**, as indicated by feelings of anger, alienation - feelings of being uprooted or displaced and a longing for a sense of community;
2) **Dissatisfaction with the perceived effectiveness of conventional political activity or forms of social protest** in producing the desired results; the belief that terrorism

is a necessity in order to defend against offensive enemies;

3) **Identification with victims**, in terms of personal victimization. Horgan (2008) exemplifies this risk factor as follows: “for European Muslims who become involved in violent jihad, this identification is with Palestinian victims of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, victims in Iraq, or the conflict in Kashmir. In Khan’s video testimony, he blamed his behavior on the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom: "bombing, gassing, imprisonment, and torture of my people," identifying with the suffering of Muslims around the world even though he came from Yorkshire, in northern England.” (p. 85);

4) **Belief that engaging in violence against the state is not inherently immoral**;

5) **A sense of reward** that the individual has about engaging in violent extremist activity and the gains in terms of status and respect within the representatives of the movement or even gains beyond death, in the afterlife.

6) **Kinship or other social ties** to individuals involved in violent extremism.

Borum (2014) focuses on individuals’ worldview, propensities, and vulnerabilities that can be proximate causes for involvement in violent extremism in some facilitating circumstances. More specifically, Borum’s (2014) approach “uses the concepts of ‘mindset’ – a relatively enduring set of attitudes, dispositions, and inclinations – and worldview as the basis of a psychological ‘climate’, within which various vulnerabilities and propensities shape ideas and behaviors in ways that can increase the person’s risk or likelihood of involvement in violent extremism.” (p. 286). Figure 8 illustrates Borum’s synthesized approach.
1) **Worldview.** Borum (2014) describes four worldview factors – authoritarianism, dogmatism, apocalypticism, and the fundamentalist mindset – that can make individuals' vulnerable or inclined to become involved in violent extremist activity;

2) **Psychological vulnerabilities.** Vulnerabilities are “factors that point to some people having a greater openness to increased engagement than others” (Horgan, 2008 as cited in Borum, 2014, p. 291). Borum lists three common psychological vulnerabilities of violent extremists: (1) a need for personal meaning and identity; (2) a need for belonging; and (3) perceived injustice/humiliation;

**Figure 8.** Borum’s approach on world view, psychological vulnerabilities, and propensities for involvement in violent extremism (Source: Borum, 2014, p. 288)

3) **Motivational propensities:** status-related, identity-related, thrill-related, revenge-related, and material-related motivations;
4) **Attributional propensities:** attributional style, attributional biases (e.g. externalizing bias, personalizing bias, hostile attribution bias, confirmation bias, jumping to conclusions), and cognitive appraisals;

5) **Volitional and affective propensities:** self-regulation and self-concept (e.g. “freedom fighter”);

6) **Attitudinal propensities:** proviolence attitudes, attitudes pertaining to perceived grievances and injustices, external threat, sensation-seeking, and disinhibition.

Loza (2007) has reviewed the vulnerability variables associated with violent extremism and terrorism and reported many of the same categories of variables that Borum (2014) has included in his model, such as: personality traits (thinking, feelings/emotions, belief system, attitudes, attributions), mindset, mental illness, criminality, cognitive and emotional dissonance, conformity, and brainwashing. Research has shown that other critical factors, such as depression (Bhui, Everitt, & Jones, 2014), personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and group-threat (Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013) are associated with vulnerability to radicalisation.

6.1. **Indicators on how to identify vulnerable people at risk of radicalisation**

The identification of vulnerable prisoners at risk of radicalisation is of decisive importance. Therefore, in the recent years, risk assessment of terrorist prisoners has emerged as a particularly critical issue in the field (Silke, 2014a).

Silke (2014b) concludes that the following issues are of critical importance in considering risk assessment of extremists and terrorists in prison. First, it is important to know the particularities of the terrorist movement and the characteristics of each individual involved in terrorist activity. Secondly, it is important to recognize that there are different types of roles around terrorist activity and this too results in very different types of terrorist prisoners. Silke identified four categories of people that should be
considered when assessing the risk for terrorism and extremism within prison settings. These four categories are illustrated in the figure below, reproduced from Silke, 2014b.

**Figure 9.** The different populations of concern for terrorist risk assessment in prison  
(Source: Silke, 2014b, p. 109)

It is important to distinguish between these four categories because the factors which apply clearly to one group are not necessarily the same as those applying to the others.

The first group that should be assessed in regards to the risk of terrorism includes those prisoners who entered prison already holding extremist views and who had engaged in various extremist actions in the outside world. Silke refers to these as the ‘True Believers’. Killers, bombers, would-be suicide terrorists, as well as ideologues, recruiters, fund-raisers and on-line propagandists can be included in this category.

The second group of concern includes prisoners who have been convicted of involvement in extremism or terrorism, but who were not radicalized when they did so. Such prisoners may have been coerced to involve in terrorist activities or may have been friends or family members of ‘True Believers’, but they will, however, have a minor role to play in the terrorist acts. Nevertheless, within the prison system, they tend to be treated as terrorists.

The third important group includes ‘ordinary decent’ prisoners, who have been radicalized within prison, possibly as a result of contact with extremist prisoners, implemented with financial support of the European Commission by the Erasmus + Programme. This publication reflects the views only of the authors. The Portuguese National Agency ERASMUS+ Education and Training and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
conversion or/and recruitment to the cause. These individuals have had no political involvement outside whatsoever, and thus risk assessment processes with some of these prisoners may be unaware that extremism is even an issue.

The final group includes the ‘vulnerables’. These again will be ‘ordinary decent’ prisoners who, while at the moment may not have radicalized, may nevertheless still be assessed as vulnerable to joining the extremists in the right circumstances.

Silke (2014b) provides a further detailed account of the appropriate factors and issues to focus on when assessing the risk of extremism and terrorism among the above mentioned categories of people. Figure 10 illustrates the general clusters in which most of these factors can be included.

**Figure 10.** Key factors for terrorist risk assessment *(Source: Silke, 2014b, p. 113)*

There are currently at least two measures which have been specifically designed for use in prison settings especially with the first of the groups of prisoners described by Silke (2014b) - **radicalized extremists** or terrorists. These are the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+), which is used in England and Wales, and the Violent Extremist...
Risk Assessment (VERA-2) which is in use in Australia and which has been designed to be used specifically with ideologically motivated violent offenders.

The VERA-2 is composed of five categories of items: Beliefs and Attitudes, Context and Intent, History and Capability, Commitment and Motivation and Protective Items. Out of 31 total items, 25 are risk indicators and 6 are risk mitigating indicators. The VERA-2 items appear in Table 2. The VERA-2 risk assessment was developed to serve as a generic approach for the range of violent extremists. However, Pressman and Flockton (2014) note that „the final risk decision is not based alone on VERA-2 interviews. All available information, reports, and intelligence from multiple sources is used to determine the ratings for each indicator and the final risk judgments. A detailed picture of the ideological nature, motivators, background, training, capacities, world view and other relevant aspects is constructed for each offender using the VERA-2 risk indicators within the provided framework. This snapshot represents the unique constituent elements of risk at a given time for a specific individual in a given situational context.” (p. 126).

Our focus in R2PRIS project is, however, especially in the group of prisoners identified by Silke (2014b) as ‘vulnerables’, namely the category of ordinary prisoners who have not been radicalized so far but are vulnerable to joining the extremists under facilitating circumstances. We consider that the personal factors described by Sinai (2014) in the first phase of the process model of prisoner radicalisation he has developed (see figure 11) reflect indicators on how to identify vulnerable prisoners at risk of radicalisation, especially when the situational factors described in phase two (see figure 12) are present within the prison.

**Table 2. The VERA-2 indicators (Source: Pressman & Flockton, 2014, p. 128)**
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VERA-2 Indicator Items (Pressman and Flockton)</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tr>
<td>BA. BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA.1 Commitment to ideology justifying violence</td>
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<td>BA.2 Perceived victim of injustice and grievances</td>
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<td>BA.3 Dehumanization/demonization of identified targets of injustice</td>
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<td>BA.4 Rejection of democratic society and values</td>
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<td>BA.5 Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation</td>
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<td>BA.6 Hostility to national collective identity</td>
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<td>BA.7 Lack of empathy, understanding outside own group</td>
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<td>CI. CONTEXT AND INTENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI.1 Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials</td>
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<td>CI.2 Identification of target (person, place, group) for attack</td>
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<td>CI.3 Personal contact with violent extremists</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI.4 Anger and the expressed intent to act violently</td>
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<td>CI.5 Willingness to die for cause</td>
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<td>CI.6 Expressed intent to plan, prepare violent action</td>
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<td>CI.7 Susceptible to influence, authority, indoctrination</td>
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<td>HC. HISTORY AND CAPABILITY</td>
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<td>HC.1 Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology</td>
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<td>HC.2 Network (family, friends) involved in violent action</td>
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<td>HC.3 Prior criminal history of violence</td>
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<td>HC.4 Tactical, paramilitary, explosives training</td>
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<td>HC.5 Extremist ideological training</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC.6 Access to funds, resources, organizational skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM COMMITMENT AND MOTIVATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM.1 Glorification of violent action</td>
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<td>CM.2 Driven by criminal opportunism</td>
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<td>CM.3 Commitment to group, group ideology</td>
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<td>CM.4 Driven by moral imperative, moral superiority</td>
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<td>CM.5 Driven by excitement, adventure</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. PROTECTIVE ITEMS</td>
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Note rating differences for protective items: high rating = more mitigation and less risk

| P.1 Re-interpretation of ideology less rigid, absolute |     |          |      |
| P.2 Rejection of violence to obtain goals |     |          |      |
| P.3 Change of vision of enemy |     |          |      |
| P.4 Involvement with non-violent, de-radicalization, offence related programs |     |          |      |
| P.5 Community support for non-violence |     |          |      |
| P.6 Family support for non-violence |     |          |      |

SP] VER FINAL JUDGMENT

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Figure 11. Pre-radicalisation personal factors as indicators of vulnerable prisoners at risk of radicalisation (Source: Sinai, 2014)

Figure 12. Situational/contextual factors and enablers that can facilitate the progression of vulnerable prisoners in the processes of radicalisation (Source: Sinai, 2014)
Summary and Conclusions

This state of the art report provides an overview of the scholarly and expert information on radicalisation with a special focus on answering the six sets of questions stated in the introduction to this report.

First, we have attempted to clarify the concepts of radicalisation and violent extremism reaching to the conclusion that the process of radicalisation involves moving towards extremist views. Then, we have discussed the extremist views of which the most dangerous lead to violent extremist actions. Prisoner radicalisation and the role of conversion in this process have been addressed in the light of the understanding of what radicalisation means in general.

Second, we have reviewed the literature on models of radicalisation in order to learn how radicalisation leads to violent extremism. We have briefly described the main general explanatory frameworks concerning the phases, pathways, and levels of radicalisation and finally discussed the main issues regarding prisoner radicalisation.

Third, we have synthesized the main theories that try to explain violent extremism, especially those relevant for the understanding of the processes that occur within the prison settings.

Fourth, we have briefly discussed the way the official institutions usually look at and address the issue of violent extremism.

Fifth, we have discussed the main aspects related to prisons that have the potential to cause them to become breeding grounds for radicalisation. One of these aspects is related to the vulnerability of prisoners who become targets of the extremist recruiters. We have discussed several recruitment tactics specifically used within prisons.

Sixth, we have discussed the main indicators found in the literature on how to identify vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation. Development of a methodological framework for analysing deradicalisation strategies within prison.
PART II. Collection of approaches, lessons learned and practices in the field of radicalisation

Introduction

This collection provides an overview of the approaches, lessons learned and practices in the field of radicalisation used by the Prison Services in four of the participant countries in the project R2PRIS: Belgium, Norway, Romania, and Turkey.

Prison Services that provided the information used in this collection:

1. Belgian Prison Service (DG EPI), Belgium
2. Directorate of Norwegian Correctional Service, Norway
3. National Prison Administration (NAP), Romania
4. Ceza Ve Tevkifevleri Genel Mudurlugu (CTGM), Turkey

The European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services (EuroPris), as a project partner, also contributed to enrich this collection by inviting other prison services to participate in the data gathering process. Therefore, the Appendix presents an overview of the findings for prison services from the following countries: Austria, Croatia, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, Germany (Mecklenburg Western Pomerania and North Rhine-Westphalia States), Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, and Scotland.
Methodology

West University of Timisoara has developed a 9-item questionnaire that circulated among project partners with the purpose of gathering information for this collection.

The questionnaire aimed at collecting information on the approaches of each Prison Service regarding the following aspects related to radicalization in prisons:

- To what extent is Radical Extremism a problem in each Prison Service
- The main extremist groupings in each Prison Service and how are they managed
- The practice regarding the holding of radical prisoners and what are the implications of this practice for radicalisation in each Prison Service
- The existence (and efficiency) of special programmes against Radical Extremism in Prisons within each country
- The existence of staff-training programmes designed to help them identifying possible extremists and sharing of best practices with colleagues across country
- The existence of mechanisms of sharing information on extremist groupings with other Prison Services or with European Agencies
- The existence of information sharing mechanisms between police and prisons in each country
- The existence of special laws in each country under which „terrorists“ are brought to justice and convicted. Is there a "correctional definition" for terrorists?
- The existence of de-radicalisation programmes implemented in each Prison Service.
### Collection of Approaches, Lessons Learned and Practices

**Table 3. Collection of Approaches, Lessons Learned and Practices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BELGIUM</strong></td>
<td>At this moment, DG EPI has a case-related view on the problem of Radical Extremism in the Belgian Prisons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORWAY</strong></td>
<td>Combating radicalisation and violent extremism is one of the priority areas of the Norwegian Government. Norwegian Correctional Service (NCS) has had experiences with radical extremism in prison, but it has not been a widespread challenge. Even though offenders related to right wing extremism have been present in the Norwegian prisons quite regularly, they have been few in numbers and they have been treated as ordinary prisoners. Consequently, they have not represented a problem as such. Major changes have taken place in Europe the last 15 years and militant jihadism has been a growing issue also in the NCS. This changes can have an impact on individual prisoners who are vulnerable to recruitment and influence of religious, ideological and political directions. The rhetoric used by groups like IS and Al Qaida is present among some groups of prisoners in our facilities. This does not incline that these prisoners necessarily are extremists. The rhetoric could just be used to inflict power over fellow prisoners and distance to staff, especially in relation to gang activity. Even so, the NCS does acknowledge that radicalisation processes that lead to violent extremism can occur. NCS presumes, though, to be in a somewhat favourable position due to the fact that they have relatively few incidents related to gang activity. Furthermore, the staff-prisoner relationship is usually of high quality. Push and pull...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **ROMANIA** | The Romanian Prison Service doesn't face a radicalisation phenomenon. Nevertheless, the department responsible for preventing terrorism within the Prison Service is currently monitoring different categories of prison population:

- inmates of whom there have been signals regarding their sympathizing with terrorist entities (from Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Ireland);
- inmates who established connections with some of the above-mentioned entities;
- inmates with a high risk of radicalization;
- inmates convicted for terrorism related crimes.

At the same time, a lot of interest is paid to inmates suspected of having been previously exposed to patterns of radicalization or to a radical ideological environment (e.g.: Romanian people imprisoned in foreign countries that face serious radicalisation issues). |
| **TURKEY** | The Turkish prisons are under the risk of radicalization in both right and left wing terrorist groups. Specifically, the number of left-wing terrorist groups are high and quite organized. They are trying to prevent the breakaway from the group and radicalize them from sympathizers to the military. However, number of members of radical Islamic terror organization is low and trying to preserve radical propensity. Both groups have same actions such as:

- To prevent them from attending classroom events like education - improvement works in prison;
- Oppress the people who try to remain separate from the terrorist organization; |
To refuse the services such as religious service, food services, etc. that are provided. By doing so, they forced them to obey the rules of terrorist organizations.

2. The main extremist groupings in each Prison Service and how are they managed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>Belgian Prison Service is managing about 110 inmates, with terrorism related facts. We gave the prison governors &amp; staff instructions for observation about their attitude, opinions, anti-Western ideas, anti-Democratic ideas, ... Those who are recruiting other inmates actively where put in strict individual regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>The experiences of the Norwegian Correctional Service are traditionally connected to prisoners who are related to different varieties of the right-wing movement. Since 2011 there have been a few prisoners whose offences are connected to religious extreme beliefs. Lately, NCS has experienced an increase in prisoners charged or sentenced for terror related offences, especially foreign fighters who has returned from Syria. The strategy for managing these offenders is risk assessment and spreading them in different units accordingly. They are treated the same way as other prisoners and monitored individually according to the assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>Until now, there haven’t been identified any extremist groupings or any trends in this direction within the Romanian Prison Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>There are 5096 convicts from left-wing terrorist groups and 475 convicts from right-wing terrorist groups (most of them are from radical jihadist groups) in Turkish prisons. According to their crime types stated by Law no. 5275, their classifications and placement are made in terms of crime types and their situation as a convict or detainee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The practice regarding the holding of radical prisoners and what are the implications of this practice for radicalisation in each Prison Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>Belgian Prison Service opened 2 sections (DERAD-EX) for 40 inmates to keep them separate from other inmates. Also, there are 5 prisons where extremist inmates can be put in special observation. Also, they are put on an individual regime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| NORWAY  | Based on individual assessments, inmates who are understood to be vulnerable to radical extreme attitudes, or those convicted of hate crimes, will be placed with other prisoners. They are spread in different prisons and are being held under the same department based on sentence and the individual's vulnerability. Obviously, there are both advantages and disadvantages with such a strategy. Some possible negative outcomes:  
- Handled by generalist staff members instead of specialists;  
- Risk of radicalising other prisoners;  
- Both the prisoner and his/her environment require close monitoring to identify any negative influences;  
- Risk of extremists mingling with criminal networks. Some possible positive outcomes  
- Prisoners are less likely to regard themselves as marginalised because of their beliefs. They will, to some extent, be treated as ordinary prisoners;  
- Prisoners might be positively influenced because of being around different groups of prisoners with different mind-sets;  
- Less likely to be regarded as martyrs by groups likeminded in society. |
| ROMANIA | The inmates tried or convicted for terrorism acts or the inmates being held for other criminal acts but who are in attention for a potential risk in adopting terrorist behaviours are not being held separately. The way they are housed inside prisons depends on the detention regime applied to them. Therefore, they are able to get in touch with other inmates that have been applied the same detention regime. If the prison committee responsible for establishing, individualizing and changing the detention regime decides that an inmate has to be included in the “inmates at risk” category, he will be included in the maximum-security regime. Inmates that execute the punishment in maximum security regime are subjected to strict measures of guarding, supervision, and escort, usually accommodated individually, work, develop educative, cultural, therapeutic, |
psychological counselling and social assistance, moral-religious, educational and vocational training in small groups, in specific areas established within the prison, under surveillance.

**TURKEY**

Enforcement of those persons is carried out by a special enforcement regime in high security prisons. According to this regime:

- They are accommodated in one or three persons room;
- Interactions of extremist radical groups and terror offenders are restricted;
- Terror offenders possessing a leader position are relocated in certain intervals to prevent their influence on the other convicts;
- Those with good behaviour may benefit from conditional release and being sent to open prison;
- Specific measures are taken to prevent ill-treatment and conditions against the respect for human dignity.

It is evaluated if these treatments give successful positive results especially regarding some convicts who intend to leave the organization.

### 4. The existence (and efficiency) of special programmes against Radical Extremism in Prisons within each country

**BELGIUM**

In consultation with the Communities, Belgian Prison Service wants to start with a programme of de-radicalisation.

**NORWAY**

No, NCS does not own any programs against radical extremism in Norwegian prisons. But NCS has various initiatives to work with the target group (see Q 10). All the same, they would point out that programs for improving the quality of life for prisoners are relevant for this group as well.

Furthermore, the Correctional Service of Norway follows some basic principles that internationally are seen as counteracting radicalisation which can lead to violent extremism:

- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
- respect for privacy and data protection
- use of community sanctions and measures
- good prison management (safety, dignity, trust, ethics)
- Extensive and intensive training/education of Prison Staff. In Norway, prison staff undergoes two years at University College level. Prison officers are trained to observe, analyse and assess the prisoners’ community with a high level of understanding and handling different cultures and beliefs.
- democratic and dynamic security are core values and competencies among staff.

| ROMANIA | Despite not having specific programmes against radical extremism within the inmate population, the Romanian Prison Service is currently developing programmes and strategic activities adapted to the specific educational, psychological and social needs of the inmates and boarded persons. The Romanian Prison Service carries out some activities which can also result in diminishing the risk of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist groups. The Service pays a lot of attention to the first period detainees spend when entering prisons. Inmates spend their first 21 days in a special section for quarantine and observation, where special evaluation and initial intervention are being carried out, under surveillance. After this period, inmates of whom there are clues or intelligence regarding extremist beliefs or behaviours are being monitored by a special department of the Prison Service responsible with preventing criminality and terrorism. This department relies to a large extent on the cooperation with the security department, the reinsertion department, as well as on external specialized counter-terrorism agencies. The inmates who pose a possible terrorist risk are included in the special category of “inmates at risk” and execute their punishment in a maximum-security regime, which involves more restrictive detention measures. |
| TURKEY | Within penal institutions in Turkey there is no special programme for radicals and Examination and Evaluation Forms for Inmates (“ARDEF”) is applied to convicts and detainees to assess their risks and needs. As a result of ARDEF, 26 different individual intervention programmes and 6 different group intervention programmes are carried out for their mental health problems in line with their emerging risks and needs. |
Within the group intervention programmes, there is a special intervention programme for convicts and detainees who cannot control their anger and are antisocial. The Anger Control Programme is very efficient and Special Monitoring and Control Programme is moderately efficient.

In the present situation, the terrorist convicts are not very willing to join these programmes.

### 5. The existence of staff-training programmes designed to help them identifying possible extremists and sharing of best practices with colleagues across country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BELGIUM</strong></td>
<td>The prison staff on the special sections has started with training/education about Radical Extremism. The others will learn by e-learning. The concept is ready. The Belgian Prison Service needs to develop the tool. Training will be a permanent investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORWAY</strong></td>
<td>NCS is working on the establishment of coordinators with especial knowledge within this field in the regions of the correctional services. These employees will act as experts for issues relating to extremism and radicalisation. Their task will be threefold. Firstly, they contribute with knowledge about the phenomenon of radicalization and guidance on how to deal with the problem. Secondly, they will distribute information between relevant partners and coordinate necessary action. Finally, they will contribute to the system for risk assessment of new inmates. There are also initiatives for generalists and also during ordinary staff training at the correctional staff academy. Furthermore, an internet based learning program is soon to be operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROMANIA</strong></td>
<td>The type of activities carried out by the specialized department in the prison units and the exchange of information between the Prison Service and external partners from Romania responsible for fighting against terrorism make a considerable contribution to the identification of the inmates at risk of adapting an extremist behaviour. As far as staff-training programmes to help identify possible extremists, the Romanian Prison Service has a rather poor experience. Nevertheless, the Prison Service has developed some activities to help initiate an organised learning process, by focusing on early prevention as a responsible and realistic way of connecting to the context of radicalisation.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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Starting with 2015, within some prison units there have been established officer teams (from 3 different prison departments: crime and terrorism prevention, security and social reinstatement), out of whom some have been trained in familiarizing with the main concepts and notions regarding radicalisation (the training was held by an international counter-terrorism expert) and all of them are being periodically sent info materials on radicalisation.

Staff members from the headquarters (crime and terrorism prevention as well as security departments) have been trained by specialists of the European Commission (the training was called „RAN - Train the trainer”) and were involved in mentoring sessions held by an international counter-terrorism expert.

Management staff form prison units (whose day-by-day routine involves direct and frequent contacts with the inmates - security and reinsertion departments) have been presented some facts about the meaning and effects of prison radicalisation and the areas where they can step in to take measures.

At the same time, all the prison staff is getting aware of prison radicalisation and of the risk factors through the E-learning platform, where the coordinating staff places info materials concerning recognizing and reacting to signs of radicalisation, in the limits of our knowledge so far.

Also, within a European financed project (aimed to develop a politics strategy and specific human resources instruments, to improve the professional competences and knowledge of the prison staff) one of the training curricula is on radicalization.

The Prison Service is interested as well in cooperating with staff from external national agencies responsible for preventing and fighting against terrorism. Taking part in common events (symposiums, conferences, and training sessions) is a way to synchronize efforts and perspectives with a means to develop a unified approach of radical extremism.

Simultaneously, regional cooperation with experts of prison services from different countries was a ground to developing an extensive and comprehensive vision on the phenomenon and it created the premises for schematizing a pattern of best practice, by sharing experience and interventions in matters related to radicalisation.

“Institutional Approach Guide” is prepared to display appropriate and standard approach for convicts and detainees and to improve awareness of all convicts, detainees and staff regarding their own mood in penal institutions and the training of it is given to all staff.
### 6. The existence of mechanisms of sharing information on extremist groupings with other Prison Services or with European Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>Belgian Prison Service does not share information automatically. Belgian is involved in the RAN to share best-practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>Yes. NCS takes part in European initiatives as RAN CoE, Europris, and R2PRIS. Intelligence is shared with other jurisdictions exclusively through police channels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>Romanian National Prison Administration does not have this kind of mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>Ceza Ve Tevkifevleri Genel Mudurlugu does not have this kind of mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7. The existence of information sharing mechanisms between police and prisons in each country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>Belgian Prison Service has a cooperation protocol since 2005 with the security services of the State. Also, it has a Plan R (radicalism): cooperation with OCAD. DG EPI organizes working groups to share information with different services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>Yes. There are special operational procedures for exchanging information between prisons, police, and Security Service. This includes structured meetings, shared regulations for shared case administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>The Romanian Prison Service has a communication network which is being used in order to have a proper and constant change of information with the national intelligence agency responsible for dealing with terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>Knowledge sharing is performed when necessary to inform relevant units. Especially, with the police department.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8. The existence of special laws in each country under which „terrorists” are brought to justice and convicted. Is there a "correctional definition" for terrorists?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>Articles 137-141 of the Criminal Code are about Terror Crime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**NORWAY**

Penal Cod in Norway reviewing acts of terrorism and terrorism-related acts. An offense is considered as a terrorist act and punishable by imprisonment up to 21 years if it is committed with terrorist intent.

Terror Purpose exists if an act committed with the intent of

a) seriously disrupting a function of vital importance to society, such as legislative, executive or judicial authority, power supply, safe supply of food or water, banking and monetary system or emergency medical and infection control,

b) seriously intimidating a population, or

c) unlawfully compelling public authorities or an intergovernmental organization to do, tolerate or omit anything of significance to the country or organization, or for another country or an intergovernmental organization.

The "correctional definition" of a terrorist will be "a person who is convicted and sentenced for terrorist act(s)". (It could also include hate crime).

---

**ROMANIA**

Romania has a law concerning prevention and fighting against terrorism. This law, among other things, states clear definitions of terrorism and terrorism-related terms, how prevention terrorism and counter-terrorism activity is being held by different authorities at the national level.

As far as the Prison Service is concerned, the implementing Regulation of the Law regarding the serving of penalties in Romanian prisons states a number of criteria to take into consideration when including an inmate in a special category called “inmates at risk”. One of the criteria is the terrorist risk.

The inmates being included in this category of “inmates at risk” execute their punishment in a maximum security regime, which involves more restrictive detention measures.

---

**TURKEY**

Law no. 3713 on Anti-Terror Law is a law related to terrorism in Turkey. There is no “correctional definition” for terrorists.

---

| BELGIUM   | Belgian Prison Service has two DERAD-EX sections, opened at 11/4/2016. |

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Also, the Imam-consultant will have an adapted training to work with this population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORWAY</th>
<th>To our knowledge, the different countries have some different or rather additional understandings of what a programme is. And Combating radicalisation and violent extremism is one of the priority areas of the Norwegian Government. In August 2014, the Government announced an action plan against radicalisation and violent extremism, which presented a framework for a targeted, strategic effort in this field. Many sectors shall contribute in the follow-up of these measures. The Correctional Service has implemented a mentor-scheme. This scheme will provide inmates who are considered in danger of being radicalised, regular follow-up in prison and also after their release. The scheme is aimed especially at young inmates. Furthermore, NCS has established some encounter groups (Dialogue workshops) which include topics as radicalisation and extremism.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>The Romanian Prison Service has not implemented yet any de-radicalisation programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>In the current practices there is no de-radicalisation programme implemented in Turkish Prison Service. Even so in frame of an IPA Project, an intervention programme for prevention of radicalization is implementing by a group of experts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART III. Development of a methodological framework for analysing radicalisation within prisons

The State of the Art detailed in the first part of the document has provided the conceptual basis for the development of the methodological framework for analysing radicalisation within prisons.

The theoretical framework highlighted that radicalisation is a dynamic process emerging from the interaction between several groups of factors. The focus of the R2PRIS project is on prison radicalisation where we propose that radicalisation is likely to be influenced mainly by factors that are situated in three levels (see Figure 12):

I. Individual
II. Among prisoners
III. Prison service/environment

The core assumption of the framework is that it is not merely the presence of specific personal or environmental factors that determines a prisoner to take the path to radicalisation, but the interaction between these factors. If we want to be able to prevent prisoners taking this path, we need to be aware that a systematic approach taking into account all these categories of factors and their interaction is more likely to be successful.
Figure 13. R2PRIS Methodological Framework for analysing radicalisation within prisons
Steps in the analysis of radicalisation within prisons

We propose that an effective analysis of radicalisation processes within prisons should follow the following steps:

**Step I – Assessing the risk associated with factors related to prison service**

In order to prevent prisoner radicalisation, prison service within each country should be able to evaluate the extent the prisons in that country are potential breeding grounds for radicalisation. Research has shown that radicalisation occurs only under specific conditions of confinement.

There are at least six important factors pertaining to each prison system that have the potential to affect the efforts to prevent prisoner radicalisation. These factors are:

1) *Prison policies regarding the assessment at entrance, the management and the placement of violent extremist prisoners.* Only a small percentage of the offenders who enter prison in each country are convicted based on counter-terrorism laws and designated specifically as terrorist offenders or violent extremist offenders. Others may have been convicted of an offence unrelated to violent extremism, but still, have the characteristics of violent extremists. Therefore, the assessment of each prisoner at entrance is crucial for the strategies of placement and management of that prisoner. In order to prevent them to radicalise and recruit other prisoners to their cause, violent extremist offenders must be first identified and then placed and managed appropriately. Failure or low capacity to identify and manage effectively the prisoners with violent extremist views is associated with a risk of radicalisation happening and spreading in that prison.

2) *Degree of cooperation between prison service and police and intelligence services* is important especially in regards to the collection and sharing of
information about the history, ideological views and networks of violent extremist prisoners. If a prison service does not have or has only limited access to such information, the identification, placement and management of violent extremist prisoners is compromised with potentially serious consequences regarding the radicalisation of others by those prisoners.

3) **Prison staff’s ability to recognize and deal with signals of radicalisation.** Close monitoring of recruitment attempts by extremists is necessary in order to prevent radicalisation in prisons, which means that prison staff needs to be able to recognize recruitment tactics and specific (progressive) responses from the target individual. There is a risk associated with prison staff not being prepared to identify both the prisoners who have the capacity to recruit as well as prisoners who are vulnerable to such recruitment activity.

4) **Degree of under-staffing** is also important. The lack of an appropriate number of staff is associated with the risk of radicalisation happening unobserved and spreading unhindered.

5) **Degree of over-crowding** is a significant risk factor for the spreading of radicalisation in prisons.

6) **Presence of cruel, inhuman, and degrading conditions of confinement** has been indicated as a risk factor for the increase of prisoners’ vulnerability to violent extremist messages.

**Step II – Assessing the risk associated with factors present among prisoners**

The weaknesses of the prison system described above are riskier when any or more of the following factors exist among prisoners:

1) **Presence of extremist social networks, such as religious-based gangs.** These social networks reach vulnerable prisoners by providing them with the physical protection and social support that such prisoners are seeking. The
radicalisation process occurs through conversion or recruitment and the radicalised inmates become followers of the extremist violent ideologies during their imprisonment and continuing upon their release from prison.

2) **Presence of extremist religions/ideologies**, such as “prison Islam”, that are embraced by some prisoners because they provide a seemingly reasonable (religious) justification to their violent behaviour.

3) **Presence of charismatic extremist inmate leaders** is an important proselytising factor in prisoner radicalisation because such leaders offer compelling role-models to alienated inmates and provide them with the support they need.

4) **Presence of extremist prison chaplains** that not only spread the extremist messages through sermons and counselling, but also by distributing extremist booklets and materials to the prisoners.

5) **Presence of outreach programs by external extremist organizations** can spread extremist messages in order to radicalise prisoners through former inmates or missionary volunteers who are representatives of such organizations.

6) “**Virtual**” presence by terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates, through their extremist publications.

7) **Presence of terrorist “kingpins”**, namely imprisoned veteran extremists who have their own strategies of recruitment and forms of outreach to other prisoners and also have the capacity to guide their followers to supportive infrastructures upon their release.

**Step III – Identifying vulnerable prisoners at risk of becoming radicalised**

The third step in the analysis of radicalisation within prisons is the identification of vulnerable individuals at risk of becoming radicalised. The presence of the following personal characteristics in individuals shows that they are potentially susceptible
and vulnerable to radicalisation: (1) history of violent behaviour; (2) anti-social attitudes; (3) a combination of personal crisis and low self-esteem; (4) a very small proportion of these individuals may suffer from mental health disorders; (5) sense of victimisation; (6) feelings of compromised identity and alienation; (7) need to belong to empowering religion/ideology; (8) seek to wipe away previous criminal deeds; (9) spiritual seeking; (10) need an external entity to blame for their personal problems; (11) political grievances, and (12) need for physical protection.

Step IV – Analysing the coexistence of and interaction between factors from the three categories within a specific prison

Radicalisation is a process of change and change is a dynamic process. The change implied by the radicalisation of prisoners stems from the coexistence and interaction between a number of factors among the most important are those mentioned above. The main processes by which vulnerable prisoners become radicalised are conversion and recruitment. These processes usually occur in specific conditions created by the interaction between individual factors, radicalising agents, and confinement conditions. Failure to take into consideration all the three categories of factors would result in an incomplete understanding of the phenomenon of radicalisation within a specific prison that will consequently compromise any efforts to prevent it.

R2PRIS project will provide a screening tool for prison staff to recognize signs of radicalisation at an early stage within their specific facility. However, in order to capture the processes of change, prison staff needs to actively and frequently observe and interact with prisoners to better understand them and consider the specific risks that each of them represents. Sound prison management policies and practices can serve at preventing violent extremist radicalisation in prisons. A well-functioning prison system will make it easier for the staff to identify individuals at risk of radicalising others or becoming radicalised and will provide the adequate instruments to address the risks and prevent the radicalisation to occur or spread.
References


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The European Union programme for education, training, youth and sport 2014-2020

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affairs/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf.


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### Appendix

**250315: Radicalisation in Prison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name of National Agency / Prison Service</th>
<th>Is radicalisation an issue in your country / prison system?</th>
<th>What is the number of incarcerated terrorist offenders?</th>
<th>Is your prison staff trained in the particular area of radicalisation?</th>
<th>Do you have procedures for detecting and reporting signs of radicalisation?</th>
<th>Which measures are taken in case of (signalling) radicalisation?</th>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austrian Prison Service</td>
<td>Yes, at present Austrian Prisons have to deal with retournees from Syria and Australia who are accused of willing to fight for the Islamic State</td>
<td>Not explicitly. In case an inmate performs an act of radicalisation (act or behaviour that could be considered as religious or cultural radicalism), an inmate could be reported to the Public Prosecutions Office who is going to carry out further actions</td>
<td>As of the reporting date of April 15th, 2015, we currently have: 3 sentenced and 30 pre-trial inmates accused of committing terrorist acts</td>
<td>Yes, the Prison Service receives training by Experts, such as Imams, introducing the history of Islam and Cultural Diversity. Further, we invite Experts from other institutions (such as deradicalisation and intelligence services). Further, we reinforce the cooperation between prison staff and family members.</td>
<td>The Prison Staff gets taught about signs of radicalisation through adequate training, according to the EU Handbook between Austria, Germany and France about Radicalisation.</td>
<td>Yes, to prevent vulnerable inmates</td>
<td>The Austrian Penal System collaborates with representatives of the Austrian Ministry of Justice, the Austrian Prison Service, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Federal Intelligence Agency, Probation Service, and Experts from abroad</td>
<td>Since Austria has to deal with retournees and foreign fighters (the Prison System reenforced the Prison. Libraries and offers two different Korans (both with German translation) recommended by Imams. All other religious book shall be delivered by the Imams working within the Prison System. Moreover, we regularly have Friday prayers (excluding Foreign Fighters/Returned) which are held in German, pastoral care and special diets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Belgian Prison Service</td>
<td>Radicalisation is an issue of importance in our prison system, as well as in Belgium society as a whole. This awareness has rapidly grown over the last few years, and this awareness has been raised by the events in France and the events in Belgium which took place shortly after the same time. The awareness about Syria retournees and specifically prison radicalisation became more</td>
<td>There are no specific laws concerning this subject. Nevertheless, recently the Belgian government has made radicalisation prevention a priority. The need for an appropriate detention system is an integral part of our 2-track policy. The central objective in this Action Plan radicalisation in prisons is on the one hand, to avoid that detainees become radicalised during</td>
<td>This group has grown rapidly in the last two years, from about 1,500 inmates to 2,500 inmates (youth and adults). The need for an appropriate detention system is an integral part of our Prison Services. The specific training has become a subject of the basic staff training since. We are looking for possibilities to strengthen this training</td>
<td>After an awareness campaign in 2017 and 2018, a dedicated team of Experts in the prison radicalisation sector, together with the intelligence service, Prison radicalisation has become a subject of the basic staff training since 2017. We are looking for possibilities to strengthen this training</td>
<td>In 2018, a protocol has been agreed between the Belgian prison administration and the intelligence sector. A rapid exchange of information is the main objective of the training. The specific training has become a subject of the, basic training since 2018. We are looking for possibilities to strengthen this training</td>
<td>Indigenous offenders are indeed the main tools for direct intervention. A system of segregation is integrated within the coming year (see 7.).</td>
<td>At the moment, we are working to complete what we call “specialised sections” (in part of the new prison), where 40 prisoners are grouped. We think of starting detention in a standard regime, and segregate those inmates developing proliferative activities. Our central Psychosocial Service will play an important role in this selection, basing their analysis</td>
<td>Collective prayers are not allowed, except for the official weekly worship. The Imam can also meet in a separate room with the inmate, during his visit once or twice a month. Religious books are available at the library, praying carpets can be bought via the carpentry. Religious symbols are allowed. Some prisoners have a halal diet, others only have a non-pork diet.</td>
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Croatia

Prison System Directorate

No, until now we had no incarcerated terrorist offenders, pre-trial or sentenced.

For last ten years we had no incarcerated terrorist offenders, pre-trial or sentenced.

Representatives of Croatian Prison Administration participate in IAN workshops and other activities where they share experiences, knowledge and best practices in area of radicalization with other European countries. We have no special training of prison staff in particular area of radicalization, but our staff is informed on this issue through their regular training (especially judicial police officers), by their colleagues who participate in IAN activities.

As we had no actual experiences with radicalization, no measures are yet taken. Options which are available according to our legislation are accommodation with prisoners which are unlikely to accept his/her beliefs, transfer to another prison and isolation (exceptionally and only for short time). If behaviour represents criminal offense, prisoner can be prosecuted as any other citizen.

We collaborate with police in prevention of any criminal behaviour, according to our common obligations which are regulated by law, but also by cooperation agreements regarding information exchange (unfortunately, no IT solutions). Although we had no experiences with radicalization, the same from of collaboration would apply in case this issue occurs.

Prisoners have the right to practice their faith by using their own literature and objects with religious purposes, and they have the right to contact with representative of their religious communities. Practicing of faith is organized for most represented religious communities according to agreements between the Government of Republic of Croatia and religious communities (Roman catholic, Greek orthodoxes and Muslim). For other religious communities, contact is made available between prisoner and official representative appointed by religious community (only with registered religious communities). Making available contacts with official religious representatives we see as preventive measures.
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>The Danish Prison and Probation Service</td>
<td>Yes - we have no evidence that radicalisation actually have taken place in the prison system but a few inmates have had a behaviour that indicated that extra attention was needed.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Currently 33 people are incarcerated - 8 pre-critical and 5 sentenced terrorist offenders. The evolution of data shows a slight increase in the numbers.</td>
<td>Yes - awareness training in detecting signs of radicalisation/violent extremism and how to report it. The training is developed in cooperation with the Danish intelligence service.</td>
<td>Yes. All staff members are supposed to be aware of signs of radicalisation and the procedure of how to report it is a part of the awareness training and it is also described and available on line.</td>
<td>The intelligence service is informed: • placing in a section where the inmates are not in risk of being affected by the radicalised view. • access to other inmates is restricted. • transfer to another prison. • placing in a restricted regime. • targeted motivational network (back on track mentor programme).</td>
<td>The overall strategy is to place all inmates according to behaviour - also terrorist offenders. A sort of mixed system, but with extra attention on the terrorist offenders, their behaviour, entourage and so on...</td>
<td>Yes - a close cooperation with the intelligence service and all reports of concerns about inmates behaviour relating to radicalisation are given to the intelligence service. A collaboration between the police, the intelligence service, the municipalities, the Prison and Probation Service is being established. No automated data transmission is established.</td>
<td>There is freedom of religion and the inmates are free to exercise their faith. Priests, imams etc. are available and prayers are organized regularly. Religious books, symbols, rosaries, prayer rugs etc are allowed. In some prisons the sermons or Friday prayer is transmitted live on TV to make it accessible to all inmates. Special diets are available and in prisons where the inmates make their own food special groceries can be ordered.</td>
<td>Yes - back on track Back on Track is a de-radicalisation project set up by the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration in collaboration with the Danish Prison and Probation Services. In the project the organisations have cooperated in developing and testing an mentoring scheme that may help to prevent and counteract crime related, to all kinds of extremism. Specifically targeted are inmates and remand prisoners who are charged with or convicted of terrorism, and/or vulnerable to radicalisation. The aim of the mentoring scheme is to help inmates become better at tackling everyday situations, problems and conflicts by: • Motivating them to opt for a lifestyle free of crime; • Involving the inmates network outside prison (family, friends etc.); • Assisting with concrete challenges surrounding...</td>
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<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>National Offender Management Service</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>We rely on the usual management interventions to deal with prisoners that are exhibiting extremist behaviours. As described above, radicalisation itself is a complex issue and not usually a single identifiable event. We therefore require staff to report on a wide range of extremist behaviours (not just religiously motivated extremism), from which we use a process to help staff understand the motivations for the exhibited behaviour. The process involves a multi-disciplinary multi-agency meeting at an establishment level that discusses all individuals that are reported as exhibiting extremist behaviour. The process seeks to understand the motivations of the prisoners and work closely with both Police and the Intelligence Services.</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>Criminal Sanctions Agency serious problem in Finland.</td>
<td>Radicalisation is not a problem. Imprisonment Act does not include such provisions. The Criminal Code of Finland has provisions on terrorist offenses. In 2014, four persons were sentenced for terrorist offenses to conditional imprisonment. These were the first judgments on terrorist offenses.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>We can apply the mentioned methods if necessary but they have been no need to use them.</td>
<td>Prisoners sentenced for terrorist offenses will be placed in one or two prison.</td>
<td>There is cooperation at local and national level. Information is given to the local police and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service.</td>
<td>Religious practice is allowed in prisons. Priests of different religions can visit prisoners when needed. Religious literature as well as instruments and symbols are allowed if they do not endanger prison order or security.</td>
<td>Whom do we not yet have such specific programs.</td>
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<td>Germany/Mecklenburg Western Pomerania</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice Mecklenburg Western Pomerania</td>
<td>No. The issue of radicalisation has high priority in our prison system.</td>
<td>We haven't special laws/regulations concerning religious</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The prison staff is trained in the area of radicalisation and prevention. The school and education center for prison staff provide education and trainings focusing on the following topics: political extremism; Islamic extremism; indicator for radicalisation and extremism; detecting signs and publications of the extremist subculture; management of conflicts. The training is held by a course system. The prison staff develops by this more professionalism and self-confidence in dealing with radicalisation.</td>
<td>We use the common procedures for detecting. The staff has to report all irregularities in prison.</td>
<td>The social workers or the psychologist decide about the special treatments and measures. They can also contact NGOs, which deal with radicalisation.</td>
<td>The Ministry of Justice is in talks with the State Office of Criminal Investigations and Intelligence services at regular intervals or in individual cases.</td>
<td>The Ministry of Justice is in talks with the State Office of Criminal Investigations and Intelligence services at regular intervals or in individual cases.</td>
<td>The exercise of religion and the religious welfare is legally fixed in the Prison Act of Mecklenburg Western Pomerania. The prisoners are free to exercise their faith. The prisoner can be excluded from the free exercise of religion and from service, only if it endangers the security and order.</td>
<td>In the moment there isn't any requirement. If the situation will change, we will organize the necessary programs.</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice North Rhine-Westphalia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italian Prison Service</td>
<td>Radicalization is a major problem in Italian prisons, so it is under close monitoring. Also the illegal immigration on the Italian coasts is a potential danger of Some directives have been issued by the Head of Department of Penitentiary Administration about radicalization and the risks of radical religious proselytism.</td>
<td>Number of incarcerated offenders for terrorism: Year Pre-crisis: 43; Finally sentenced: TOTAL 2013.</td>
<td>The prison staff members, in particular the Penitentiary Police Officers, are trained to manage and to observe.</td>
<td>In order to avoid any situation at risk, the prisoners charged with or sentenced for crimes of terrorism are included in the penitentiary level names “High security.” In the case of reports of dangerous proselytism or of radicalization, the subjects involved are put under monitoring or under.</td>
<td>Each case is evaluated by the investigative and institutional offices (see answer no. 5, the “High Security” 2 level). Currently, the subjects charged.</td>
<td>There is a strong collaboration with other law enforcement agencies through a Strategic Analysis Counter-Terrorism Committee, based at the Ministry.</td>
<td>The Italian Constitution (art 8) recognizes the right of everyone to profess their religion.</td>
<td>At present, there are no “procedures” of de-radicalization.</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Latvian Prison Administration</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Only with operative work methods.</td>
<td>Such methods have not been stated.</td>
<td>At the moment, no.</td>
<td>Police and other Special Services would contact us if a terrorist would be admitted to a prison.</td>
<td>The inmates in Latvian prisons, in accordance to the national normative acts, have the opportunity to realize their rights to religious freedom – they can freely change their religion, meet a chaplain, take part in religious actions organized by religious organizations (these rights are also insured for those inmates belonging to the Islam). The actions of religious organizations are supervised in prisons, i.e., the religious events happen in the presence of a prison staff member. Until now no provocation of discord or religious hate by any of religious organizations (Muslim congregation included) have been noted. In addition, the spiritual care of the inmates are being organized and carried out by the chaplains of the Administration chaplain service. They abide by ecumenism in their duties of spiritual care and they encourage the</td>
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Queries related to the R2PRIS Project can be addressed to Professor Nuno Garcia, ngarcia@di.ubi.pt

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